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Debunking the Myth of Foreign Meddling in Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution

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Debunking the Myth of Foreign Meddling in Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution

Unpacking the sensational – and implausible – accusations made by a former U.S. State Department official.

Debunking the Myth of Foreign Meddling in Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution

People chanting victory slogans on the premises of the National Parliament House in Dhaka, Bangladesh on the afternoon of August 5, 2024, shortly after Sheikh Hasina’s resignation.

Credit: Saqlain Rizve

From 2009 to 2024, Bangladeshi society had endured an increasingly suffocating political climate. A deep-seated frustration with the state system was brewing – an anger not always visible but ever-present beneath layers of state control and surveillance.

Bangladesh functioned under a model of strict state oversight. The former government of Sheikh Hasina did not hesitate to suppress dissent, normalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Hasina’s regime has been accused of overseeing 1,926 extrajudicial killings and 1,676 cases of enforced disappearances. Political opposition, activists, and critics from across ideological lines faced brutal crackdowns. Many were confined to secret detention centers, infamously known as “mirror houses.” 

Hasina’s grip extended beyond the physical world into the virtual sphere. Before the one-sided 2018 election, she enacted the draconian Digital Security Act, targeting journalists and social media activists who dared to voice dissent. Between 2018 and 2022, 1,109 cases were filed under the law, resulting in the arrest of 161 opposition politicians and 138 journalists.

Tensions reached a breaking point in mid-2024 when a mass uprising erupted, led by students and ordinary citizens. On August 5, facing overwhelming resistance, Hasina fled to India, bringing her nearly 16-year rule to an end. However, her departure came at a staggering human cost – over 700 people lost their lives and 19,000 individuals were injured in government crackdowns as the regime desperately tried to hold onto power.

Revolutions often leave behind a volatile vacuum, and Bangladesh was no exception. The immediate aftermath saw factional disputes over claims to revolutionary credit, while fears of counter-revolution and civil war loomed large. The Syrian conflict served as a grim reminder of how revolutions like the Arab Spring could lead to prolonged instability and chaos.

On August 8, a new interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, took charge. It faced immense challenges: unifying the country’s political factions, stabilizing governance, and meeting the aspirations of a youth-driven movement became its primary priorities. Despite these hurdles, the interim government succeeded in preventing a descent into civil war or sectarian strife – an achievement that cannot be overlooked.

While Bangladesh’s new government gained swift recognition and support from global powers and international organizations, India reacted with hostility. This marked a continuation of New Delhi’s traditional stance, which had long been centered on unwavering support for Hasina. Since her father’s era, Hasina has had deep ties with India, even taking refuge there for six years following the assassination of her family in 1975. According to BBC Bangla, more than 1,000 leaders of Hasina’s Awami League took shelter in India after her ouster in 2024.

This abrupt shift in power in Dhaka has become a major foreign policy challenge for New Delhi. Indian media outlets have played a key role in amplifying disinformation campaigns against Bangladesh’s new government, further escalating tensions.

The Foreign Interference Narrative

Amid the geopolitical tensions, accusations of Western-backed regime change began circulating. A former U.S. State Department official alleged that USAID played a role in “destabilizing” Bangladeshi politics. However, such claims largely ignore the organic nature of the uprising. Those who witnessed the Monsoon Revolution firsthand understand that it was a long time coming – rooted in years of systemic oppression, youth activism, and collective resilience.

The movement was not an artificial, foreign-funded effort. It was born out of years of repressive governance and the ideological unity forged among those subjected to Hasina’s rule. The seeds of this uprising were sown as early as 2018, when two significant youth movements – the Quota Reform Movement and the Safe Roads Movement – challenged state authority. Although Hasina managed to suppress these movements through arrests and intimidation, they laid the foundation for what unfolded in 2024.

The school students who led the Safe Roads Movement in 2018 grew into university leaders by 2024, equipped with experience in organizing, evading state surveillance, and sustaining a movement against an authoritarian system. By the time the Monsoon Revolution erupted, they had learned from past mistakes and ensured that their uprising could not be easily dismantled.

The protests were largely organic, with people mobilizing independently. Protesters relied on home-cooked food and grassroots organization rather than external financial backing. Moreover, the movement grew exponentially only after the Hasina administration responded with extreme force, including firing from helicopters and burning bodies, making it evident that the movement was driven by a widespread demand for justice rather than foreign intervention.

The scale of the movement was so vast that the notion of foreign actors orchestrating it with a few hundred dollars is implausible. This was a people’s movement – one driven by the real grievances of Bangladeshi society, culminating in the fall of one of South Asia’s most entrenched autocrats.

The Mike Benz Controversy

The claims of foreign interference also come from a dubious source, who made several factually inaccurate statements in his remarks.

Former U.S. State Department official, Mike Benz, alleged that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) played a role in last year’s regime change in Bangladesh. Speaking to Tucker Carlson, a controversial right-wing commentator in the United States, Benz claimed that the U.S. backed the movement against then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina because she opposed Washington’s efforts to establish a military base in the region to counter Chinese influence.

Benz asserted that the U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI), supported by the State Department and USAID, worked to “destabilize Bangladeshi politics.” He further claimed that the Monsoon Revolution was driven by LGBT activists, ethnic minority groups, and student organizations, who allegedly received financial backing from USAID.

Benz’s claim that the IRI supported the anti-Hasina movement contradicts facts on the ground. In Bangladesh, the IRI is known for publishing surveys that often favor Hasina’s government. In 2018, when the whole of Bangladesh was facing Hasina’s crackdown and fears of enforced disappearances, the institute claimed 66 percent of Bangladeshis supported Sheikh Hasina as prime minister. That validation helped fuel her push for another one-party election in 2018. In fact, many anti-Hasina activists have criticized the IRI for its perceived alignment with the ruling party. 

Benz’s claim that the movement was supported by LGBT activists is largely unfounded. Bangladesh remains a deeply conservative society where LGBT rights are highly taboo. Open identification as part of the LGBT community is rare, and activism for LGBT rights is minimal compared to neighboring countries like India and Nepal. Given the social and legal constraints, it is implausible that LGBT activists played a significant role in the uprising.

Bangladesh’s ethnic minorities, who make up less than 1 percent of the population, have long struggled for inclusion in mainstream society. Their limited political influence and ongoing marginalization make it unlikely that they could be key stakeholders in any mass uprising. Benz’s argument overlooks these realities. Instead, he seems to be grafting U.S. political narratives onto Bangladesh.

Benz’s argument appears to serve a domestic political agenda; it certainly doesn’t present an accurate account of Bangladesh’s political landscape. His inclusion of LGBT issues – despite their irrelevance to Bangladesh’s political movement – suggests an attempt to cater to right-wing U.S. audiences. He also emphasized USAID’s involvement at a time when the Trump administration held a critical stance on USAID. Benz’s accusation could be politically motivated, aimed at attracting attention from both the audience and the Trump administration.

The Reality Behind Bangladesh’s Monsoon Revolution

The events of July-August 2024 in Bangladesh were not the result of a foreign-funded plot but rather a spontaneous mass movement involving students, citizens, women, minorities, and people from all walks of life. The movement was fueled by deep-seated frustration with the Hasina administration, not external influence.

Claiming that a few foreign dollars orchestrated such a massive uprising diminishes the sacrifices and struggles of the people who took to the streets for their rights.

Benz’s claims fail to hold up against the realities of the movement and seem more aligned with serving domestic political narratives in the United States rather than reflecting the true dynamics of Bangladesh’s political crisis. Yet because this narrative suits the interests of certain parties, Benz’s comments have received more attention than they deserve.

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