In early January, a powerful 6.8 magnitude earthquake struck the remote Dingri county (Shigatse) on the Tibetan Plateau, generating thousands of aftershocks within the first three days. The ripple effects were felt in neighboring Bhutan, India, and Nepal. It was the most severe earthquake to impact the Himalayan region in the past century. Media observers have argued that this natural disaster may serve as an indicator of the deleterious effects of China’s unsustainable exploitation of Tibetan ecological resources to satisfy its domestic developmental imperatives.
Days before the earthquake, in late December, China had announced plans to build one of the largest hydroprojects in the world on Tibet’s Yarlung Tsangpo River, triggering strong opposition from neighboring Himalayan states and the Tibetan community. Beijing’s relentless pursuit of large-scale infrastructure projects in Tibet – under the guise of economic development – is exacerbating the region’s environmental fragility. Critics argue that such projects, particularly in an ecologically sensitive and seismically active zone, not only threaten local ecosystems but may also contribute to heightened seismic risks. The question, then, is whether China’s unchecked exploitation of Tibet’s natural resources is not just an environmental crisis in the making but a direct catalyst for disaster.
In this context, the Dalai Lama has always been a forward thinker. He has over the years been tirelessly campaigning about the dangers of playing with natural forces or disturbing the ecological balance of the high mountains of Asia, including China. Even against the background of suffering due to the Dingri earthquake, the Dalai Lama not only offered prayers but also invoked “the Buddhist spirit of seeking to transform adverse circumstances into an opportunity for growth and thus a stage on the path to enlightenment.”
In light of the Dalai Lama’s long-standing climate advocacy, the words “opportunity,” “growth,” and “path to enlightenment” should not be interpreted narrowly, whether in purely economic or religious terms. Instead, they must be understood within the broader context of sustainable development, ecological responsibility, and ethical governance in Tibet as a way to course correction. Primarily, this refers to protecting the endangered “Third Pole” – the largest frozen mass on the planet after the North and South poles – and coalescing an international community to resist damaging human actions, including over-damming, over-mining, and over-harnessing of Himalayan resources.
But does the Dalai Lama, who retired from active politics in 2011, have the world’s ears? In the constant din of perpetually advancing technological needs, does the world even care for his philosophy on nature and the environment?
Tibet’s Ecological Future Is Greatly Interlinked with Cultural and Religious Repression
As the debate around the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation heats up, President Xi Jinping and his ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are looking to increase their stranglehold over Tibetan Buddhism. In this context, the Dalai Lama, acutely aware of China’s power and intent to manipulate the Tibetan belief system, has been ambiguous about reincarnation. He has even contemplated publicly an end to “the institution of the Dalai Lama” and wholeheartedly espoused the modern democratic system via the Tibetan government-in-exile. Yet the ruling CCP has heightened its preparations (by using forced approvals) to deal with this pressing religious issue, as part of bigger geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons.
Further, a New York Times report highlighted China’s deliberate erosion of Tibetan identity via the abhorrent practice of separating Tibetan children from their families through special Chinese boarding schools. There are also efforts to politically undermine Tibetan identity by erasing the very term “Tibet,” as seen in China’s recent push to standardize “Xizang” (Mandarin word for the region) in diplomatic and official documents, as well as across state media platforms. This shift is not merely semantic but part of a broader strategy to reinforce Beijing’s narrative of control. Tibetan sources argue that “Tibet” predates “Xizang” by nearly a thousand years, making this linguistic imposition yet another tool in China’s ongoing efforts to reshape historical and cultural discourse.
These moves reflect the state’s deep-rooted paranoia over losing control of occupied territories. China needs to maintain complete authority over the valuable Tibetan Plateau and the vast natural resources it offers via its control of the region’s culture, language, religion, and identity. This centralized control, however, only exacerbates the environmental degradation and climate crisis unfolding in the region.
Tibet serves as a vital source of glaciers and rivers, fueling some of Asia’s largest waterways. From the great Dzachu (Mekong), which is one of the world’s longest waterways, to the steep Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) which has natural hydropower generation potential, these waterways nourish billions of people in South and Southeast Asia. Tibet’s rivers provide essential resources such as water, food, and fisheries, and support agricultural livelihoods, among many other human needs. Beyond these, the region’s rich biodiversity plays a critical role in maintaining ecological balance.
However, Tibet is also a central hub for “geological disasters,” making its environmental stability crucial not just for local populations but for broader regional security. As a result, Chinese scholars have also highlighted the critical need for maximizing conservation in a region such as the Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon, where the region’s geological instability frequently causes landslides and debris flow, among other disasters. Yet the Chinese government seems unmindful, as evidenced by the spate of big dams in this region, and the growing threat from earthquakes, flash floods, and other calamities in the extended neighborhood.
More concerning still is how the drive to control this region’s natural wealth and strategic significance becomes increasingly apparent through China’s expanding infrastructure initiatives, further deepening its hold on both the environment and the geopolitical landscape. China has long employed dual-use infrastructure strategies in Tibet and along the borders of India, Bhutan, and Nepal, integrating civilian projects with military utility. This is not a new development but has been decades in the making. China’s building of rail and road infrastructure in the early 2000s contributed to the so-called development of the region by allowing greater access to Chinese and other profit-oriented international companies to erode the Tibetan ecosystem.
For example, international reports at the time questioned the economic viability of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, completed at an official cost of $4.1 billion, noting that its financial justification was tenuous and that any potential benefits “would appear to lie decades in the future,” if they materialized at all. This underscores how infrastructure projects in Tibet often serve purposes beyond economic development, reinforcing China’s long-term political and strategic objectives in the region.
Certainly, China’s “Go West” policy, under which such programs were propagated, enhanced China’s economic-military control and helped further Chinese exploitation of mineral resources. But as reports about China’s uber-militarization of Tibet indicate, the focus is on supporting China’s climate and economic goals for country’s politically dominant east, be it harnessing water and electricity through the construction of dams or digging oil pipelines.
To make matters worse, big Western companies like BP – one of the largest foreign investors in China’s energy and petrochemicals sectors – were in the past accused of being involved in oil exploration in Tibet, neglecting the social and environmental impact assessments, as well as human rights concerns.
The Chinese government has also focused on developing the model “border Xiaokang” (referring to “moderate prosperity”) villages launched in 2017 via the “Plan for the Construction of Well-off Villages.” Yet, these are drawing from China’s civil-military fusion policy (e.g., using civilian settlements to securitize China’s sensitive border areas in Xinjiang and Tibet), per Xi’s security-obsessed strategic thinking. Such measures have ensured the forced relocation of Tibetans across multiple border counties.
Notably, the question of whether Chinese investments in essential infrastructure genuinely serve local Tibetans remains largely rhetorical. The deeply entrenched view of Tibetans as “separatists” within the Chinese political establishment has long obstructed any prospect of holistic and inclusive development in the region. Instead, China’s subsidy schemes have increased China’s control over the Tibetan people, as local agriculture practices and nomadic livelihoods have given way to unsustainable practices such as using Tibetan manual labor for mining, or dam-building – sectors that not only accelerate environmental degradation but also reinforce Tibetans’ economic dependence on the Chinese state.
U.N. Forums and the Climate Crisis in Tibet – No Deal?
One of the most troubling aspects of the growing climate crisis in Tibet is the lack of teeth of international institutions, most notably the United Nations-led agencies. Certainly, such a challenge is reflected across issues, including traditional and nontraditional areas of security like climate change. The raging wars and perennial conflicts in various parts of the world and the inability of global and regional organizations, such as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to stem them is very much linked to the global leadership community’s indifference toward global climate change.
In this regard, the disappointing results from the last two U.N. climate conferences – namely COP28 and COP29, held in 2023 and 2024, respectively – are an eye-opener.
Certainly, the failure to recognize that the Third Pole demands urgent strategic intervention – rather than just academic analysis – has contributed to its exclusion from global policymaking priorities. Despite a wealth of climate reports from esteemed institutions like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), which repeatedly highlight the region’s vulnerabilities, meaningful action remains elusive. This lack of political will has relegated the Himalayas and Tibet to the periphery of international agendas, even as their environmental stability is crucial to billions across Asia.
Then there is also the general inability to find consensus among states on climate issues. That paralysis is not limited to the Himalayan agenda but also includes small islands in the Indo-Pacific region. The failure to phase out fossil fuels due to concerns and clout of big economies like China and India, as well as oil producer Saudi Arabia – all considered developing economies – is a case in point. In contrast, countries in the industrialized West, including European countries that are rather stringent about the green transition, are shying away from fulfilling their financial responsibilities.
For the Third Pole, the prospect of climate action faces an additional barrier: China’s control of the U.N. bodies and China’s clear warning against anyone violating Beijing’s red lines, including Tibet and the “One China” principle – even as Tibetan leaders insist that the latter “has nothing to do with Tibet,” only Taiwan. As a result, climate action in the Third Pole, as elsewhere, is taking a backseat among such political squabbles and assertions of territorial aggression.
Channeling the Dalai Lama’s Climate Urgency
The Dalai Lama, in an interview in 2020, warned against the effects of global warming and the flurry of human activities (e.g., deforestation, mining, and damming) on the Third Pole, where rivers will dry and “eventually Tibet will become like Afghanistan.” For the billions of people dependent on Tibetan natural resources, primarily the many Asian rivers that originate in the Tibetan Plateau, such a looming scenario would be undoubtedly catastrophic.
This issue combines two of the Dalai Lama’s pertinent concerns: China’s relentless repression of Tibet and Tibetans, and the international community’s lack of genuine political will to address climate change. As one of the most vocal critics of China’s occupation, he has consistently condemned Beijing’s systematic sinicization of Tibetan culture, religion, education, language, and traditions – an orchestrated effort that erodes Tibetan identity. He has also highlighted the forced relocation of nomadic communities, China’s strict censorship and information blockade, the spread of disinformation, and the reckless overexploitation of Tibet’s natural resources. Notably, he has repeatedly criticized global powers for their misplaced priorities, lamenting that “big nations who spent a lot of money for weapons or war” remain complacent in allocating resources to fight climate change – an existential threat that requires urgent and coordinated action.
Even as Tibet’s revered spiritual leader advocates for smaller, practical, and individual ways to pursue a healthier, more climate-friendly lifestyle, ultimately governmental and inter-governmental actions have to lead the way. Individual responsibility, while important, cannot substitute for the large-scale policy interventions and structural reforms needed to address the escalating environmental crisis in Tibet and beyond. Unfortunately, with Donald Trump, a resolute climate denier, starting his second term as the U.S. president and Xi’s unchanging stance on damming Tibet’s rivers – not to mention, the United Nations’ apathy – Tibet’s climate crisis may just be another casualty.
This piece is part of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA)’s “Climate Crisis in Tibet” research project.