Ever since China began a major round of military reforms in 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never stopped pursuing organizational restructuring. Amid that process, lessons learned from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War pushed the PLA to make adjustments to the command and management of aerospace-related forces in particular.
Observation from CCTV images
On January 24, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid an inspection visit to a unit of the Northern Theater Command as part of his concern for military personnel prior to the Lunar New Year. During the visit, Xi extended his “Happy New Year” greetings to grassroots service members in different parts of the country via video calls. The video calls covered various units around the country, including a squad from an army brigade of the Southern Theater Command, an on-duty division of a shore-based anti-ship missile naval regiment of the Eastern Theater Command, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the Air Force of the Central Theater Command, a monitoring and early warning station of the Aerospace Force, the 2nd battalion of a transportation regiment of the Zhengzhou Joint Logistics Support Center, and the 3rd battalion of the Shigatse detachment of the People’s Armed Police Tibet Corps.
The most noteworthy among these video clips showed the monitoring and early warning station of the Aerospace Force. From the disclosed images, it can be observed that the station has a large strategic early warning radar, specifically a P-band phased array radar. It is intended to serve as part of China’s ballistic missile early warning system. According to Chinese media reports, the radar has already been assigned to the Aerospace Force, which is less than one year old.
PLA’s Previous Management of Aerospace-Related Forces
In handling aerospace-related issues, the PLA used to be in a state of “having multiple drivers in a carriage,” indicating a decentralization of power that was not favorable to aerospace development. Aerospace bases were formerly managed by the now-defunct General Armaments Department, which was disbanded during the military reforms in 2016. The erstwhile department’s main functions have been taken over by the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC). However, some rocket launcher-related technologies benefited from the research and development of the former Second Artillery Corps and its successor, the Rocket Force, which was established as a result of the military reform. Furthermore, some relevant air surveillance radars were managed by the Air Force.
All these factors resulted in a certain degree of confusion in the management of aerospace affairs across the services. The 2016 military reform contributed to the establishment of a space systems department within the then newly-formed Strategic Support Force (SSF), an arrangement aimed at integrating aerospace resources and affairs. However, subsequent media reports showed that major satellite bases were still under the control of the Equipment Development Department. The space systems department of the SSF could only manage back-end remote sensing systems and interfaces between communication systems, while the rest of the tasks were still handled separately by other services.
The biggest problem was that although the SSF was on an equal footing with other services like the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, with its leader at the same rank of general (full theater command commander grade) as other service commanders, the director of its space systems department was only at the grade of corps-level major general. It was relatively difficult for a corps-level major general to coordinate aerospace-related affairs across the services due to the hierarchical nature of the military.
This led to another organizational restructuring at the end of April 2024. The SSF was disbanded as a result, and its subordinate space systems department was elevated to the status of a separate branch, namely the Aerospace Force we now know, the leader of which is at the grade of theater command deputy commander. The arrangement was likely modeled after the U.S. Space Force. The positioning of the Aerospace Force as a branch directly controlled by the CMC is intended to integrate aerospace-related organizations.
A ballistic missile defense system requires the integration of interceptor missiles, surveillance satellites, ground-based radars, and the computing of terminal systems. If the PLA had continued to rely on the previous command hierarchy and force structure to handle the task, it would surely encounter problems with system integration and execution of orders, both of which are critical to the time-sensitive operations of missile defense. However, from the images disclosed this time, it can be seen that the PLA has transferred large early warning radars from the Air Force to the Aerospace Force, likely a result of the reorganization in April 2024. This means that the PLA Air Force’s former guiding principle of “integrated air and space operations with both offensive and defensive capabilities” has become a thing of the past. Instead, a new command mechanism led by the Aerospace Force has emerged, responsible for handling space affairs and integrating related organizations that were previously dispersed across various services or branches.
Nevertheless, in ballistic missile defense, air defense missiles remain under the control of the Air Force. To what extent has the Aerospace Force integrated its capabilities with these air defense missile systems? The answer has yet to be found out.
Conclusion
After Donald Trump took office again as U.S. president, the world’s attention has been focused on the tariffs Trump vowed to impose on some countries and the subsequent trade wars. Despite that, the possibility of a new Cold War between the United States and China continues to rise. During the past Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the key to maintaining the balance of power was their mutual nuclear deterrence. That is the reason why the U.S. has been keeping a close watch on China’s nuclear capabilities in recent years. Various defense reports and think tank papers provide a glimpse into these efforts.
Under this strategic assumption, the integration of ballistic missile defense and aerospace systems becomes a top priority. What needs to be observed is whether China will learn from the experience of Soviet-era Russia and conduct anti-missile maneuvers in joint military exercises with Russia. As observed in China-Russia aerospace security exercises in recent years, the focus has been on ballistic missile defense. Whether the military exchanges between the two countries will move from table-top war games to actual troop deployments in realistic environments remains to be seen.