On April 29, 2005, Japan and India authorized the “strategic orientation” of their Global Partnership, initially established in August 2000. Later, this partnership evolved into a “Strategic” and further “Special” one, reflecting the growing convergence of their diplomatic priorities. Amid China’s rising assertiveness, this enduring partnership has served as a cornerstone of regional stability in Asia – a development significantly shaped by Japan’s late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (in office 2006-07 and again from 2012-2020), whose commitment to strategic engagement with India was unparalleled.
In March 2005, Abe, then acting secretary-general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), visited New Delhi ahead of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s official trip. Bearing a letter from Koizumi, Abe met with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on March 22. According to the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, Abe said at the time that “deepening political and security dialogue with India, which has tremendous potential, is crucial to Japan’s global strategy.”
Abe’s Engagement With India
Although largely overlooked in Japanese diplomatic history, this 2005 visit epitomizes Abe’s longstanding engagement with India. In contrast to his widely noted August 2007 visit – where he delivered a landmark address – Abe had also privately visited India in 2004 with his wife, Akie. As revealed by Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s current external affairs minister, Abe paid a courtesy call on Singh, at the instigation of Jaishankar, resulting in “a substantive meeting.”
Much less known is Abe’s May 1984 visit to Pakistan and India as secretary to his father, then-Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro, who accompanied Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro on official meetings with Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Diplomatic archives and testimony from a former Foreign Ministry official, who wished to remain anonymous, confirm Abe’s inclusion in the delegation – although few at the time could have predicted that this discreet participant would return decades later as the chief guest at India’s Republic Day.
Abe’s Quad initiative, comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – as proffered in his July 2006 book, “Utsukushii Kuni e” (Toward a Beautiful Country) – and his Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, officially launched in August 2016, are now widely recognized. He is generally acknowledged as an Indophile figure, yet the history of his engagement with India remains underexplored. A renewed analysis of this dimension would illuminate key developments in Japan’s strategic diplomacy over the past two decades.
Strategic Tilt Toward New Delhi
In August 2000, Japan’s then-Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro visited India to repair bilateral ties, which had been strained by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. Mori and his Indian counterpart, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, agreed to establish a Global Partnership, which Vajpayee further reconfirmed during his December 2001 visit to Japan. However, early momentum was hindered by shifting political priorities and global events.
In the early 2000s, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq posed foreign policy challenges for Tokyo. The Koizumi administration (April 2001–September 2006) was further occupied by the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea – a political endeavor dear to Abe even at a time when Japanese society was indifferent. Despite some top-level exchanges, Japan’s incumbent prime minister had not visited New Delhi since August 2000.
Finally, in preparation for Koizumi’s visit to India in late April 2005, Abe traveled to New Delhi to sound out India’s stance on the strategic orientation of the partnership, which was later officialized during Koizumi’s visit. Abe also used this opportunity to discuss cooperation in the energy sector, which was pursued by Nakagawa Shoichi, then the head of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and a close political ally of Abe.
By the mid-2000s, strengthening ties with New Delhi became a shared understanding in Tokyo. However, it was Abe who, at the political level, most vigorously espoused India from a strategic perspective. Prior to his famous 2006 book, Abe had already proposed a prototype of the quadrilateral consultation in an interview with Kasai Yoshiyuki, an influential figure in Japan’s railway sector and Abe’s long-time supporter. In that July 2005 interview, Abe acknowledged India’s importance and called for “regular meetings of the U.S. plus Asian democracies,” explicitly naming the current Quad members.
A few months later, amid controversy surrounding Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, Abe advocated the need to take a broader view in building international partnerships. In this context, he emphasized not only the Japan-U.S. alliance but also building a close relationship with India. Citing India, Australia, and Indonesia, he proposed including the U.S. in “regular strategic meetings with such Asian democracies.”
“Natural Allies” in Asia
One might reasonably ask why Abe prioritized India in his strategic diplomacy. As he later explained, witnessing Koizumi’s difficulties with China and South Korea over historical issues, Abe developed a mindset that dealt with these two countries “with a broader perspective, overviewing the globe,” and “not bound by bilateral relations.” In this approach, India – an enduring friend of Japan and a fellow democracy – emerged as a critical partner.
Abe was also keen to counter Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvering. For instance, shortly before Koizumi’s official visit to India, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi to announce a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership. In an April 15, 2005 column for the now-defunct evening tabloid Yūkan Fuji, Abe suggested that Wen had expedited his trip to preempt Koizumi’s and create the misleading impression that “Japan is isolated in Asia.”
Japan’s strategic pivot toward India was based on a careful assessment of the regional security landscape, particularly the China-India-Japan triangle. Behind the scenes, Abe must have understood India as a natural ally. While he also acknowledged Indonesia’s strategic value – traveling to Jakarta before arriving at India in August 2007 and again choosing Indonesia as one of his first destinations after returning to office in December 2012 – it never supplanted India in his diplomatic calculus.
Upon becoming prime minister in September 2006, Abe formalized the Japan-India Strategic Global Partnership during then-Indian Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Tokyo in December 2006. Their joint statement called for dialogue among “India, Japan, and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific,” laying the groundwork for the first-ever Quad meeting at the administrative level, held in Manila in May 2007.
Abe’s second tenure in office (December 2012–September 2020) marked a deepening of this alignment. In September 2014, he concluded the Special Strategic and Global Partnership with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, significantly enhancing defense and security cooperation amid rising regional tensions with China.
India as Abe’s “Lifework”
Even while in opposition, Abe remained committed to advancing Japan-India relations. In September 2011, he delivered a speech titled “Two Democracies Meet at Sea” at the Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), emphasizing the importance of maritime cooperation. Foreshadowing the FOIP vision, he asserted that “as natural allies, India and Japan must work even harder to keep our great maritime asset open, free, and safe.”
Even though he was no longer in government, Abe, always tenacious in his policy advocacy, explicitly described diplomacy with India as his “lifework.” His deep personal interest may have been rooted in family history. His grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, recounted his positive experiences during a 1957 visit to India, including interactions with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. These formative stories likely shaped Abe’s cherished lifework.
As he demonstrated, Abe’s “discovery of India” epitomized a strategic rediscovery of India by Japan. His celebrated “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech, delivered before the Indian Parliament in August 2007, captured this shift. According to Abe, “Japan has undergone ‘The Discovery of India’, by which I mean we have rediscovered India as a partner that shares the same values and interests…”
Abe’s strategic overture to New Delhi two decades ago laid the foundation for the Indo-Pacific strategy that he and his team developed in stages, culminating in the official launch of the FOIP in August 2016. The confluence of his two strategies – Indo-Japanese and Indo-Pacific – shaped broader Asia’s regional order. In this respect, Abe’s strategic foresight left a lasting imprint on Asian history.