America First

The U.S. cannot sustain its influence or meet its objectives in the Indo-Pacific with only hard power or material inducements to other states.

The administration’s approach to competition with China, and to global engagement more broadly, could unwittingly facilitate the extension of Beijing’s influence.

The new U.S. president’s remarkable but often untested initiatives add to already complex regional dynamics, hampering viable strategies and policy options seeking stable regional order.

A disproportionately hardline policy from the incoming Trump administration could ultimately see a more isolated U.S. lose the tech war, and a great deal more. 

Politicians like Rand Paul embrace a firm non-intervention stance, which results in a far more moderate approach to China issues.

After the fall of Kabul, there will be an element of doubt surrounding U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific.

While relatively minor, the duty runs counter to the administration's assiduous attempts to build a regional coalition to stand up to China.

If the United States is to engage in a long-term great power competition with China, it will need to decouple from the Trump administration’s “America First” agenda.

While the Thai government has shrugged off the decision, it is unlikely to do much to improve relations between Washington and Bangkok.

Xi's address followed (and implicitly responded to) a typical broadside from U.S. President Donald Trump.

"One dismisses the president’s longstanding beliefs that allies such as South Korea are free riders at one’s own peril."

The U.S.-South Korea SMA negotiations have devolved into a blatant shakedown. That's bad for both sides.