Speculating about China’s possible political futures is an intellectual activity that intrigues some and puzzles many. The conventional wisdom is that the entrenched Chinese Communist Party (CCP), so determined to defend and perpetuate its political monopoly, has the means to survive for an extended period (though not forever). A minority view, however, holds that the CCP’s days are numbered. In fact, a transition to democracy in China in the next 10 to 15 years is a high probability event. What stands behind this optimistic view about China’s democratic future is accumulated international and historical experience in democratic transitions (roughly 80 countries have made the transition from authoritarian rule to varying forms and degrees of democracy in the past 40 years) and decades of social science research that has yielded important insights into the dynamics of democratic transition and authoritarian decay (the two closely linked processes).
To be sure, those believing that China’s one-party regime still has enough resilience to endure decades of rule can point to the CCP’s proven and enormous capacity for repression (the most critical factor in the survival of autocracies), its ability to adapt to socioeconomic changes (although the degree of its adaptability is a subject of scholarly contention), and its track record of delivering economic improvement as a source of legitimacy.
To this list of reasons why the Chinese people should resign themselves to decades of one-party rule will be a set of factors singled out by proponents of the theory of predictable regime change in China. Among many of the causes of the decline and collapse of authoritarian rule, two stand out.
First, there is the logic of authoritarian decay. One-party regimes, however sophisticated, suffer from organizational ageing and decay. Leaders get progressively weaker (in terms of capabilities and ideological commitment); such regimes tend to attract careerists and opportunists who view their role in the regime from the perspective of an investor: they want to maximize their returns from their contribution to the regime’s maintenance and survival. The result is escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and growing alienation of the masses. Empirically, the organizational decay of one-party regime can be measured by the limited longevity of such regimes. To date, the record longevity of a one-party regime is 74 years (held by the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union). One-party regimes in Mexico and Taiwan remained in power for 71 and 73 years respectively (although in the case of Taiwan, the accounting is complicated by the Kuomintang’s military defeat on the mainland). Moreover, all of the three longest-ruling one-party regimes began to experience system-threatening crisis roughly a decade before they exited political power. If the same historical experience should be repeated in China, where the Communist Party has ruled for 63 years, we may reasonably speculate that the probability of a regime transition is both real and high in the coming 10-15 years, when the CCP will reach the upper-limit of the longevity of one-party regimes.
Second, the effects of socioeconomic change –rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates, along with the improvement of communications technologies — greatly reduce the costs of collective action, de-legitimize autocratic rule, and foster demands for greater democracy. As a result, authoritarian regimes, which have a relatively easy time ruling poor and agrarian societies, find it increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible to maintain their rule once socioeconomic development reaches a certain level. Statistical analysis shows that authoritarian regimes become progressively more unstable (and democratic transitions more likely) once income rises above $1,000 (PPP) per capita. When per capita income goes above $4,000 (PPP), the likelihood of democratic transitions increases more dramatically. Few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can survive once per capita income hits more than $6,000 (PPP). If we apply this observation and take into account the probable effect of inflation (although the above PPP figures were calculated in constant terms), we will find that China is well into this “zone of democratic transition” because its per capita income is around $9,100 (PPP) today, comparable to the income level of South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s on the eve of their democratic transitions. In another 10-15 years, its per capita income could exceed $15,000 and its urbanization rate will have risen to 60-65 percent. If the CCP has such a tough time today (in terms of deploying its manpower and financial resources) to maintain its rule, just imagine how impossible the task will become in 10-15 years’ time.
If this analysis is convincing enough for us to entertain the strong possibility of a democratic transition in China in the coming 10-15 years, the more interesting follow-up question is definitely “how will such a transition happen?”
Again, based on the rich experience of democratic transitions since the 1970s, there are five ways China could become democratic:
“Happy ending” would be the most preferable mode of democratic transition for China. Typically, a peaceful exit from power managed by the ruling elites of the old regime goes through several stages. It starts with the emergence of a legitimacy crisis, which may be caused by many factors (such as poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, and endemic corruption). Recognition of such a crisis convinces some leaders of the regime that the days of authoritarian rule are numbered and they should start managing a graceful withdrawal from power. If such leaders gain political dominance inside the regime, they start a process of liberalization by freeing the media and loosening control over civil society. Then they negotiate with opposition leaders to set the rules of the post-transition political system. Most critically, such negotiations center on the protection of the ruling elites of the old regime who have committed human rights abuses and the preservation of the privileges of the state institutions that have supported the old regime (such as the military and the secret police). Once such negotiations are concluded, elections are held. In most cases (Taiwan and Spain being the exceptions), parties representing the old regime lose such elections, thus ushering in a new democratic era. At the moment, the transition in Burma is unfolding according to this script.
But for China, the probability of such a happy ending hinges on, among other things, whether the ruling elites start reform before the old regime suffers irreparable loss of legitimacy. The historical record of peaceful transition from post-totalitarian regimes is abysmal mainly because such regimes resist reform until it is too late. Successful cases of “happy ending” transitions, such as those in Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil, took place because the old regime still maintained sufficient political strength and some degree of support from key social groups. So the sooner the ruling elites start this process, the greater their chances of success. The paradox, however, is that regimes that are strong enough are unwilling to reform and regimes that are weak cannot reform. In the Chinese case, the odds of a soft landing are likely to be determined by what China’s new leadership does in the coming five years because the window of opportunity for a political soft landing will not remain open forever.
“Gorby comes to China” is a variation of the “happy ending” scenario with a nasty twist. In such a scenario, China’s leadership misses the historic opportunity to start the reform now. But in the coming decade, a convergence of unfavorable economic, social, and political trends (such as falling economic growth due to demographic ageing, environmental decay, crony-capitalism, inequality, corruption and rising social unrest) finally forces the regime to face reality. Hardliners are discredited and replaced by reformers who, like Gorbachev, start a Chinese version of glasnost and perestroika. But the regime by that time has lost total credibility and political support from key social groups. Liberalization triggers mass political mobilization and radicalism. Members of the old regime start to defect – either to the opposition or their safe havens in Southern California or Switzerland. Amid political chaos, the regime suffers another internal split, similar to that between Boris Yeltsin and Gorbachev, with the rise of a radical democratizer replacing a moderate reformer. With their enormous popular support, the dominant political opposition, including many defectors from the old regime, refuses to offer concessions to the Communist Party since it is now literally in no position to negotiate. The party’s rule collapses, either as a result of elections that boot its loyalists out of power or spontaneous seizure of power by the opposition.
Should such a scenario occur in China, it would be the most ironic. For the last twenty years, the Communist Party has tried everything to avert a Soviet-style collapse. If the “Gorby scenario” is the one that brings democracy to China, it means the party has obviously learned the wrong lesson from the Soviet collapse.
“Tiananmen redux” is a third possibility. Such a scenario can unfold when the party continues to resist reform even amid signs of political radicalization and polarization in society. The same factors that contribute to the “Gorby scenario” will be at play here, except that the trigger of the collapse is not a belated move toward liberalization by reformers inside the regime, but by an unanticipated mass revolt that mobilizes a wide range of social groups nationwide, as happened during Tiananmen in 1989. The manifestations of such a political revolution will be identical with those seen in the heady days of the pro-democracy Tiananmen protest and the “Jasmine Revolution” in the Middle East. In the Chinese case, “Tiananmen redux” produces a different political outcome mainly because the China military refuses to intervene again to save the party (in most cases of crisis-induced transitions since the 1970s, the military abandoned the autocratic rulers at the most critical moment).
“Financial meltdown” – our fourth scenario – can initiate a democratic transition in China in the same way the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 led to the collapse of Suharto in Indonesia. The Chinese bank-based financial system shares many characteristics with the Suharto-era Indonesian banking system: politicization, cronyism, corruption, poor regulation, and weak risk management. It is a well-known fact today that the Chinese financial system has accumulated huge non-performing loans and may be technically insolvent if these loans are recognized. In addition, off-balance sheet activities through the shadow-banking system have mushroomed in recent years, adding more risks to financial stability. As China’s capacity to maintain capital control erodes because of the proliferation of methods to move money in and out of China, the probability of a financial meltdown increases further. To make matters worse, premature capital account liberalization by China could facilitate capital flight in times of a systemic financial crisis. Should China’s financial sector suffer a meltdown, the economy would grind to a halt and social unrest could become uncontrollable. If the security forces fail to restore order and the military refuse to bail out the party, the party could lose power amid chaos. The probability of a collapse induced by a financial meltdown alone is relatively low. But even if the party should survive the immediate aftermath of a financial meltdown, the economic toll exacted on China will most likely damage its economic performance to such an extent as to generate knock-on effects that eventually delegitimize the party’s authority.
“Environmental collapse” is our last regime change scenario. Given the salience of environmental decay in China these days, the probability of a regime change induced by environmental collapse is not trivial. The feed-back loop linking environmental collapse to regime change is complicated but not impossible to conceive. Obviously, the economic costs of environmental collapse will be substantial, in terms of healthcare, lost productivity, water shortage, and physical damages.Growth could stall, undermining the CCP’s legitimacy and control. Environmental collapse in China has already started to alienate the urban middle-class from the regime and triggered growing social protest. Environmental activism can become a political force linking different social groups together in a common cause against a one-party regime seen as insensitive, unresponsive, and incompetent on environmental issues. The severe degradation of the environment in China also means that the probability of a catastrophic environmental disaster – a massive toxic spill, record drought, or extended period of poisonous smog– could trigger a mass protest incident that opens the door for the rapid political mobilization of the opposition.
The take-away from this intellectual exercise should be sobering, both for the CCP and the international community. To date, few have seriously thought about the probability and the various plausible scenarios of a regime transition in China. As we go through the likely causes and scenarios of such a transition, it should become blindingly clear that we need to start thinking about both the unthinkable and the inevitable.
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Leo
As a native Chinese of age 21. I personally vote for “Financial meltdown”. It's a bad scenario, though. In late 1980, many young people believed in democracy but nowadays youth only cocern thier materialist life. pp in china don't have full understanding of the value of "western values". the new leadership seems no intent to run a real reform. I worry about my home country's prospect. “Financial meltdown” may be the final situation.
je
It is better off for experts like Mr. Pei and Mr. Chong to stick to one camp rather than try to be more neutral. The reality is probably a bit towards the middle, but it is up to the "been there done that" audience to decide.
MANOJ KUMAR PRADHAN
IN FUTURE PARTYLESS DEMOCRACY WILL PREVAIL ALL OVER THE WORLD . JAI PRAKASH NARAYAN ADVOCATED PARTYLESS DEMOCRACY .GANDHIJI ALSO WANTED TO DISSOLVE CONGRESS PARTY . GANDHIJI ,S MODEL OF VILLAGE REPUBLIC WILL GIVE FREEDOM TO PEOPLE .
vincent
I am chinese.I think i can meet that day but not now.You know chinese is a huge population country,i cant imagine what will happen if we become a whole democracy …
what do u think?
wintpuCanada
This Mr. Pei sound like Gordon Chong who wrote a book 20 years ago about the imminent implosion of China. Events proved him totally at sea. Gordon Chong is still around every year coming up with another statement why China is "now" really, really in trouble. This Mr. Pei is creating job-security for himself seeing how Gordon Chong still finds CNN calling him an "authority". There is a lemmings rush of Jingo-controlled news organizations eager to amplify anything China does into cardinal sins, heinous massacres or aggression. The last I checked of 10 Western giant news organizations’ Beijing Bureau Chiefs, only 3 had qualified facility in Chinese. [1] Evolution of expression is what has happened in China. During Deng's times it was always speculated by western "experts" that every transition in China would involve fratricides as in Soviet expression of Lenin-Trotsky-Stalin-Malenkov-Krushchev-Brezhnev-Gorbachev. In fact the TianAnMen incident had the mixing of opportunists taking the student movement against corruption into a regime change. The little appreciated fact is the soft power of Deng's personal wisdom, example and nurturing of a next generation leadership who, even now, are always asking "What would Comrade Xiaoping have liked us to do?" Especially now, Xi Jinping represents a third generation after Deng and he is trying to revive that fantastic release of energy that Deng set in motion. Pei is correct in saying that the people will seek greater and greater say and they are saying it more and more and the CPC is negotiating this new reform drive changing their formula and trying different models. No one has mentioned a CPC relatively new custom called "Getting Scriptures". What it is that the CPC has multiple levels of internal news bulletins that all leaders at each level are send every week. So a particular city which has done something new and gets good results would be disseminated immediately all over China, and weaker cities' mayors or new mayors would plan on leading a team to go and visit that particular "poster child city" to learn their practices and try to bring their Scriptures back a templates for use in their home cities. Thus the whole nation has a system of mechanisms to shifting directions at multiple levels. Can you think of any Developed "Democratic" nation that has this system of mutual learning? Imagine the new Mayor of Milwaukee taking 30 top city officials running off to New Orleans to embed for a week into their various department to note their every aspects, and then running off again to New Jersey again after a hurricane to learn disaster.
[2] Pei is warning that the citizenry will revolt. All through the last 34 years there have been various local issues. The CPC method was to make changes in numerous little ways without being doctrinaire about it. They actually record all the protests track them nationally to current 100,000 incidents big and small so that they are mostly small. The recent Wukan incident of the whole town rising up against unfair expropriation of land by large enterprises where the local chief called in 10,000 police and armed police to surround 10,000 active citizens. Wang Yang the secretary of the Province sent in his duty and they defused the issue as the local chief being in the wrong. This was judged as a "people's rights" local revolution in the traditional of peasants' revolt and that they were right to rise up. Wang Yang was touted by western press as deserving of becoming one of the top 7. He was not, but he is Vice Premier now and his replacement has also addressed another dispute in the press with the same open approach. That reflects the increasingly responsive measures of the CPC. There is a line-up of young people competing to take exams to join the CPC and they pick the best and the brightest. Xi has ratcheted up the call for anti-corruption and the netizens, in the majority in the general population have responded by posting their own investigation of official who are corrupt. The Politburo and Cabinet have set an example of discipline from the top and it has shaken all levels of CPC. Expensive seafood suppliers are seeing a dip in restaurant consumption as all official are responding to the new "clean government" drive. The anti-corruption group is overwhelmed by applications for joining their "mission", or transfers to. The have moved Wang Qishan, an economic problem solver to this powerful position to deal with corruption.
[3] Taking the TianAnMen incident of 22 years ago, Pei is biting it as a one-issue event and using it to describe a China that is the same as the times of 1989. The only issue from most of the critics of the CPC on this event is that it was sheer brutality of the evil CPC to destroy a Democracy Movement. Without delving into the many shades of grey in that, the fact is China has evolved so much more in the last 22 years. It was a very painful event for the leaders of China because the diddling and inaction let the situation changed from students raising anti-corruption issue, at first accepted by the elders, turning more and more aggressive into asking for the resignations of the Premier and cabinet. Many of these kids were children of the party leaders. That was how painful it became. Therefore the CPC is still very sensitive to this event. Because there were clear evidence of external agents in the square escalating, they are especially chagrined by the preachy West. No way anyone can go back 22 years and create a new upheaval from it.
[4] Economic Collapse will cause the collapse of the CPC. Yes agreed. The big "IF" is Pei seems quite ignorant of the various gigantic restructuring programmes of China already started three years ago and already showing results. As Gordon Chong intimates, China's energy consumption was not in step with the 7.8% growth in 2012 and therefore the CPC must be lying. For them to be lying, China must be suffering worse, rather than recovery from the rest of the world's financial problems. For a deeper analysis, this lack of dramatic increase in energy usage is a dramatically positive sign that their massive focus on Energy Savings and New Renewable Energies is taking hold and accelerating.
[5] Pollution is a major problem for China's environment. In putting growth and industrialization as the first wave of priorities, they knew it was a sacrifice and trade-off versus staying in poor backwards status. Those in the West in the environment industries will laugh at Pei's article because they are swamped by company executives, government environmental officials from China with massive amounts of money to spend on technology and solutions. For example, on Coal-fire Power Plants, China mandated nearly a decade ago that catalytic converters must be installed on these plants to denitrify and desulferize their flue-gas. It created a massive bonanza for engineering firms in China during two years. GE, Alstom, ASEA, B&V made a killing without telling the world press. The giant ones have been retrofitted. The smaller ones and older ones are now being fitted because Chinese factories have restructured and created their own units. 2012, China surpassed US as the world's #1 spender in green projects. There are many issues of pollution, so has the world.
DANIEL MARTIN
chances are it will all work out that way
for world peace 's sake!
Lesterado
China if becomes a democracy, will succumb to pressure from its ultra nationalistic citizens. Beware of what you wish for.
Tthgj1uu
What a load of nonsense, ting_m_1999. What is the “Soviet party”? In what sense is Taiwan a one-party state? In what sense is Japan one? Above all, what you seem incapable of understanding is that Minxin Pei is not trying to undermine China or destroy China, he’s trying to help China. Would a China that can choose its own destiny really be so bad?
ting_m_1999
If Taiwan and Japan are not one party state, neither is China. You can also say that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are trying to help USA too!