Play The Diplomat’s Quiz: February 25, 2018 Edition

There are thought to be between 40,000 and 75,000 Indian-Indonesians living in North Sumatra, although firm data is difficult to come by as census documents no longer list ethnicity in Indonesia. Most Indian-Indonesians are Tamil. According to Tamilnation, a website dedicated to providing information about the Tamil diaspora in Indonesia, “The Tamils were brought in by the Dutch in the early build-up of the plantation industry, probably in the 1830s.”

When the Dutch colonial period came to an end in the 1940s, “5,000-10,000 Tamils stayed on in North Sumatra, mainly in Medan, but also in Binjai and Lubuk Pakam (…) The Tamils have remained in North Sumatra except for a few hundred families in Jakarta and the Tamils that went to Sigli in Aceh.”

This week we saw another round of hype surrounding the holding of the first ASEAN-China maritime exercise. Although the idea is far from new, the very fact that it is being scheduled for this year is testament to broader changes that have been underway over the past few years, both in the region more broadly as well as in terms of the South China Sea more specifically.

The idea of an ASEAN-China maritime exercise is far from new. As I have noted before, China first officially proposed it at the holding of the inaugural ASEAN-China Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting (ACDMIM) back in October 2015 as one of several ways to boost security cooperation between the two sides (See: “The Truth About China’s New South China Sea Drill Proposal with ASEAN”).

From February 2 to 4, Myanmar’s military carried out their first tri-service exercise in over two decades. The drills reinforce the military’s determination to advance its modernization even amid continued international scrutiny over its behavior.

It was one of the earliest, and most exciting, reforms announced: Uzbekistan was going to throw open the doors and toss out onerous visa procedures for a litany of countries. But a month after announcing the visa-free plan, Tashkent punted the changes to 2021, claiming the need for time to develop the necessary resources.

For many regional watchers, the announcement and quick reversal revealed hints of a power struggle in Tashkent. As new Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev gradually sidelined his rivals, one stayed exactly where Islam Karimov had put him: Rustam Inoyatov, the head of the National Security Service (SNB). The SNB, rumors held, had opposed the visa changes.

Last week, Inoyatov was dismissed from his position at the SNB. He was appointed a presidential advisor and given a Senate seat, a less-powerful position but also one that comes with immunity from prosecution.