In late summer, I joined fellow Doublethink Lab (DTL) co-founder and now Democratic Progressive Party legislative candidate Puma Shen in visiting Ukraine. In doing so, DTL became the first Taiwanese civil society organization (CSO) to act on a seeming truism in international relations analysis and related media commentary: that Taiwan should learn from Ukraine’s experience of conflict.
“The island [sic] would be harder to invade and easier to isolate than Ukraine, but the latter’s lessons appear clear: bolster preparations and push for training and arms from elsewhere, with the hope of fending off any invasion for as long as possible,” The Guardian wrote in an April 2022 editorial. Irrespective of whether hot war arrives on Taiwan’s shores, both democracies are longstanding victims of hybrid warfare initiated by a larger authoritarian neighbor. They are united in enduring state-directed information operations that aim to sap morale at home and undermine support for resistance overseas.
And from the point of view that it is better to be safe than sorry should People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping decide to annex Taiwan by force, there are numerous steps Taiwan can take to act on wisdom accrued at lamentable cost in Ukraine. Discussions on this point encompass reinforcing territorial and civil defense capabilities, enhancing energy security, and even reassessing investment strategies to accommodate military asymmetry.
Yet despite the parallels, engagement with Ukraine on behalf of Taiwanese politicians, military officials, and civil society representatives has so far been negligible. In fact, Taiwan’s Trade Center Representative in Kyiv, Yu-Hsuan Hsu, told us that as far as he was aware, there were only three non-combatant Taiwanese in the whole country at the time of our visit.
Hsu omitted the estimated 20 or so Taiwanese volunteers who have at some stage served in Ukraine’s armed forces, whose whereabouts and status are classified. For their sacrifice alone, Ukrainian civil society would likely be willing to acquiesce to Taiwanese requests for advice and assistance. Donations of humanitarian aid worth more than $100 million and Taipei’s enactment of sanctions against Russia would also stand Taiwan in good stead.
At a government level, there are reasons on both sides for a lack of engagement. Ukrainian officials acknowledge the absence of diplomatic relations between Kyiv and Taipei, and are wary of antagonizing the PRC, which professes neutrality while retaining the power to mediate a potential resolution of their conflict.
In Taiwan, despite widespread public sympathy for Ukraine’s plight, the imminent elections have put foreign affairs and defense policy discussions largely in the shade. Taiwanese politicians are now reluctant to remind voters of a connection once leveraged by both major parties to curry favor with the electorate.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in particular has been painted into a corner by messaging from the opposition Kuomintang suggesting that a vote for continuity this weekend means a vote for conflict. Even for DPP presidential candidate William Lai, previously a strong advocate of stronger ties with Ukraine, the issue has fallen off the agenda. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s minister of national defense has deemed Ukraine “incomparable” due to differences in geography, demography, and geopolitics.
Such willful blindness should be called out and replaced with clear-sighted vision. Whoever emerges as Taiwan’s new president, their administration must rip off the blindfold and take a lead in encouraging Taiwanese CSOs to more actively cooperate with Ukrainian counterparts.
Multifaceted Potential in Taiwan-Ukraine Civil Society Cooperation
During our trip, the DTL team visited Ukrainian CSOs engaged in fact-checking, strategic communication, civil defense, human rights protection, search and rescue volunteering, and anti-corruption initiatives for rebuilding projects, as well as both independent and mainstream media groups.
While each visit yielded specialist knowledge, the overarching takeaway was that Ukraine’s resistance has been so effective in part because of harmonious civil and governmental cooperation.
A primary example is the so-called institutionalization of Ukrainian efforts to counter Russian information operations, evinced by the 2021 establishment of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (SPRAVDI) under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine.
The center was initially staffed by recruiting civil society experts, allowing Ukraine’s existing disinformation CSOs to continue functioning independently – augmenting capacity rather than replacing it.
According to Mykola Balaban, SPRAVDI’s deputy head, it took at least six months for the center to embed with the existing government apparatus and for its people to explain their roles and requirements to the multidisciplinary arms of government needed for counter disinformation operation efforts to be successful.
Balaban’s primary advice for Taiwan is to foster CSOs that explicitly counter disinformation and false narratives, and ensure they have a close working relationship with government institutions. “They should know each other personally and establish instant communications channels so they can double check information and react immediately,” he said.
CSOs can take the first step by learning firsthand what this integration looks like on the ground. Indeed, the diplomatic constraints that hinder direct involvement by the Taiwanese government in Ukraine make facilitating the placement of CSO observers there a matter of urgency.
With the right encouragement and support, CSOs can document and share how to effectively coordinate conflict operations across multiple fields, such as fire control, drone hacking, humanitarian logistics, or the delivery of training courses on, say, drone piloting.
Ukrainian CSOs have even been empowered to take charge of the acquisition and storage of weapons and equipment, though this is a situation of last resort that entails significant complications. Taiwanese counterparts could at least pass notes on how to manage gray zone responsibility conflicts between civil defense units, the emergency services, and the military.
Ukraine can also share experience in fields such as lawfare and mental health preparedness. While we hope they will never be necessary, developing coping mechanisms in times of conflict could prove immensely beneficial for Taiwanese CSOs and the population as a whole.
Perhaps most impactfully, we witnessed how the ongoing process of rebuilding Ukraine, epitomized by the reconstruction of villages like Nalyvaikivkais, serves to rally national resilience. Such rejuvenation has played a huge role in maintaining morale – another factor Taiwanese CSOs can consider, alongside various logistical practicalities.
Finally, Taiwanese CSOs can draw inspiration from Ukraine’s success in administering
creative projects that boost psychological resilience, such as the successful propagation of wartime memes, which are unlikely to take shape within staid government departments or the military.
In short, fostering collaboration with Ukrainian civil society organizations emerges as a strategic imperative for Taiwan. Unconstrained by diplomatic and political limitations, CSOs can play a pioneering role, setting a precedent for broader engagement.
It is incumbent on all Taiwan’s presidential candidates to articulate their position on this issue. The incoming government should strengthen collaboration with Ukrainian CSOs, or provide a compelling reason to the contrary.