Last week, China kickstarted its challenge to the U.S. firm SpaceX’s Starlink mega-constellation with the launch of its first batch of 18 satellites, as part of its Spacesail Project. China’s Spacesail internet constellation, under a prime contract with China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), and built by Shanghai Spacesail Technologies Co. Ltd, promises to supply low latency, high-speed internet.
The Spacesail Project has three phases: by 2025, 648 satellites will be launched to provide regional internet coverage; by 2027, an additional 648 satellites will be launched to expand this to global coverage. The third phase aspires to launch 15, 000 satellites by 2030 that will offer “mobile-directed multiservice integration.”
Spacesail is among three satellite constellations that China has planned for. Another is the GW constellation, a planned constellation of 13,000 satellites, and the third is the Honghu-3 constellation, which aspires to launch 10,000 satellites within a decade.
Like other sectors of the space industry, Earth Orbit internet or satellite internet is an emergent area of competition. For China, achieving leadership in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite industry market means seizing strategic advantage, given “the first come, first serve” nature of this industry. China aspires to emerge as a leader in the field of satellite internet by 2030.
LEO-based satellite constellations have several advantages: proximity to Earth, low latency, and easy launch capacities via China’s Long March 6A. For China, satellite internet is part of its new infrastructure as per a 2020 concept from the National Development and Reform Commission, and also features in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Integrated coordinated development of Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), Middle Earth Orbit (MEO) and LEO satellites are of specific significance, providing China with a long-term edge in its burgeoning commercial space industry. In 2024, the global space industry was worth $570 billion with a 7.4 percent increase from 2023 ($531 billion).
This year, China’s lunar missions also had major successes. The Chang’e 6 sample return mission to the Lunar South Pole successfully landed in the southern part of the Apollo crater in June 2024 and returned samples to Earth. I have written here about the game-changing nature of China’s Chang’e 6 missions.
Separately, an analysis of the 2020 Chang’e 5 lunar samples has confirmed the presence of water molecules in a lunar region previously believed to have no water. Chang’e 5’s samples were taken from the middle latitude part of the Moon, an area that was earlier diagnosed as not stable enough for water molecules to exist. This discovery supports China’s aims to develop an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) on the Moon by 2036, the development of which would require the presence of water.
In 2026, China will launch the Chang’e 7 which aims to survey the lunar regolith, focus on developing an in-depth understanding of lunar terrain, and create a map of lunar water presence. Russia, Egypt, Thailand, Switzerland, and the International Observatory Association will help develop some of the scientific instruments on the Chang’e 7.
China’s ILRS includes 12 nations as partners (Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela). However, the ILRS in its current form does not offer clear principles on how these nations will collaborate, what they agree to abide by, and who will contribute how much to the mission, except for a rather general Guide to Partnerships issued in June 2021 by the China National Space Administration. There is no clear regulatory framework for the ILRS.
This is in contrast to the Artemis Accords that NASA has issued, which currently has 43 member nations. However, Artemis Accords aside, the U.S. space program has faced recent setbacks. NASA canceled its robotic Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) lunar mission this year, citing development delays and cost overruns as the major issues for the cancellation. VIPER would have searched for ice and other potential resources on the Lunar surface.
NASA also canceled its OSAM-1 (On-orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing) mission “due to continued technical, cost, and schedule challenges, and a broader community evolution away from refueling unprepared spacecraft, which has led to a lack of a committed partner.”
By contrast, China is investing in its ability to develop OSAM, especially refueling satellites and large platforms in LEO and GEO. China’s Ministry of Science and Technology has included OSAM as part of China’s strategic technologies, and the Central Military Commission views OSAM as an integral part of China’s space capacities. Since 2018, the Chinese military has been developing OSAM capabilities through computer simulation. All this is geared toward ensuring that the People’s Liberation Army maintains in-orbit operations during times of conflict.
China has launched nearly 360 military satellites aimed at intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities in LEO and GEO, and recently reorganized its military space force with the establishment of its Aerospace Force. China is also developing its ability to hit moving targets, most likely in a Taiwan scenario, by utilizing its remote sensing satellite architecture.
Among the satellites to watch for is the classified optical remote sensing satellite Yaogan 41, launched in December 2023. Yaogan 41 is located at 36,000 km above Earth in GEO, positioned over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Coupled with China’s artificial intelligence (AI) capability, Yaogan’s data can be integrated to create maps of potential flashpoints for China.
In a paper published in 2022, China-based analysts claimed that by combining AI and China’s commercial Earth observation satellite images from the Jilin 1, a 95 percent target recognition efficiency was achieved with moving car-sized objects. China plans to launch 138 Jilin 1 satellites by 2025.
In July 2024, a study led by Hong Jun at the Dalian Naval Academy asserted that they had developed an algorithm that could identify U.S. warships based on satellite imagery. This will help in target identification by China in these potential conflict flashpoints. As per Major General Greg Gagnon, deputy chief of space operations for intelligence for the United States Space Force, “China is building a massive architecture of remote-sensing satellites to help target U.S. forces if they move to defend Taiwan in a conflict.”
China’s ability to steadily develop its space capabilities – civilian, military, or commercial – has direct strategic consequences for the United States, be it in space, or here on Earth, specifically areas in the Asia Pacific where the U.S. is heavily committed to maintain international order. China recognizes the critical significance of space-based assets to the development of strategic advantage and has made calculated decisions to integrate different technologies across the spectrum of LEO, MEO, and GEO to build that joint integrated advantage. We must recognize these moves as a way for the Chinese Communist Party to ensure China, and not the U.S. or its partners and allies, is able shape the future international order.