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China Treads Cautiously After Hasina Is Driven From Power in Bangladesh

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China Treads Cautiously After Hasina Is Driven From Power in Bangladesh

For China, Hasina’s ouster brings dreaded instability – but also a potential opportunity.

China Treads Cautiously After Hasina Is Driven From Power in Bangladesh

In this July 5, 2019, file photo, Bangladesh’s then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping as she arrives for a meeting at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.

Credit: AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, Pool

On August 5, in a stunning turn of events, Bangladesh’s long-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was driven from office – and from the country – by massive protests. As often is the case, things happened gradually – the protests had been building for over a month, despite increasingly repressive tactics from Hasina’s governments – and then suddenly.

Now Bangladesh’s neighbors are struggling to come to grips with the unexpected upheaval in a country that had been a hallmark of political stability, albeit at the cost of an authoritarian turn, during Hasina’s 15-year reign.

For China, Hasina’s ouster brings both peril and promise, and the government knows it. So far, Beijing has been tight-lipped on the shocking development, issuing only one terse statement. “China is following closely the developments in Bangladesh,” said a Foreign Ministry spokesperson in a written statement posted on the ministry’s website. “As a friendly neighbor and comprehensive strategic cooperative partner of Bangladesh, China sincerely hopes that social stability will be restored soon in the country.”

There was little opportunity to press for details, as the regular weekday press conference was on summer break from August 5 to 16. (Curiously, though, the Foreign Ministry held a press conference on August 6 – but didn’t address Bangladesh at all. Instead, the lion’s share of the questions dealt with Pakistan, including ongoing unrest in Balochistan and the safety of Chinese workers.)

China’s state news agency, Xinhua, likewise ran only a brief story, with a focus on the military chief’s call for people to “remain calm” and “maintain peace and order.”

The emphasis on stability underlined China’s main concern. Beijing doesn’t want political unrest in its neighborhood, and while Bangladesh doesn’t immediately border China, the two have a close relationship. 

“Political turmoil means instability, which is not something China would like to see,” Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, told The Diplomat via email. “It will bring more uncertainty and volatility to Chinese projects in the country.” 

China has been increasingly active in Bangladesh under the framework of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. According to the Bangladeshi outlet Prothom Alo, China has loaned Bangladesh nearly $3 billion since fiscal year 2019-2020, equal to around 40 percent of China’s total loans to Dhaka since the two established diplomatic relations. “Currently, some 14 projects are being implemented with Chinese loans amounting to nearly $10 billion,” Prothom Alo reported. 

Perhaps most notably, a Chinese firm constructed the Padma Bridge, held up by the Hasina government as a crowning achievement upon its completion in June 2022.

China was quite comfortable doing business with Hasina, and in fact the two sides elevated their relationship to the level of a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” during Hasina’s visit to Beijing in July – less than a month before she fled the country. On the same trip, China and Bangladesh “signed 20+ agreements,” Yun pointed out. “The relationship with China has been doing well during her reign.”

However, China has also faced setbacks in Bangladesh, often due to Hasina’s attempts to balance between the interests of China and India. Even as Beijing stepped up its financing to Bangladesh, Dhaka nixed a deep-sea port at Sonadia Island that would have been constructed by a Chinese firm. These Chinese port projects in the Indian Ocean are a perennial concern to New Delhi, which sees them as dual-use facilities that can host Chinese surveillance ships in peacetime and potentially encircle India in a contingency. 

More recently, Hasina is believed to have irked China by deciding to take up India’s offer to fund the Teesta River water management project – which Beijing had offered $1 billion toward. Analysts believe that’s one reason why China declined to provide a $5 billion loan Hasina had requested during her recent trip to Beijing. 

Now, the sense that China was losing ground to India in the competition for influence in Bangladesh under Hasina could turn into a blessing in disguise. New Delhi is widely believed to have supported Hasina, looking the other way as she cracked down on opposition and preventing critics of Hasina’s authoritarian bent – including the U.S. government – from exacting penalties. 

That approach has indelibly tied together India and Hasina’s Awami League in the mind of ordinary Bangladeshis. Following the controversial general election of 2024, which saw Hasina re-elected for a fourth consecutive time amid reported irregularities and an opposition boycott, Bangladeshi social media influencers launched an “India Out” campaign to register their frustration with New Delhi. Proponents of the boycott directly accused India of “relentless meddling in Bangladesh’s domestic affairs.”

With Hasina now gone, India’s all-in approach to the Awami League has turned out to be a bad bet. Beijing will be looking to step in with a larger role as creditor and partner when the next government is formed, pending a fresh round of elections. 

Notably, in late June Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Vice President Abdul Awal Mintoo was one of the many political leaders who met with Liu Jianchao, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department, during Liu’s visit to Dhaka. In India, the BNP – which as the main opposition party is now in prime position to form the next government – is seen as “anti-India” and responsible for the “India Out” campaign.

“Bangladesh is traditionally seen as in the Indian sphere of influence. If the change of government has an impact over that, I don’t think the Chinese government will necessarily see itself as a net loser from the political turmoil,” Yun said.

That said, China is hardly celebrating Hasina’s ouster, even if it could improve Beijing’s standing in the geopolitical contest with India. For one, China has not supported the cause of democracy in Bangladesh any more than India has. Beijing proudly and loudly supported Hasina’s election victory this year, while slamming the United States and other governments for interfering in Bangladesh’s internal affairs by pointing to the uneven playing field. 

The Bangladesh-China joint statement issued on July 10 during Hasina’s trip to Beijing doubled down on that narrative, congratulating Bangladesh for the election and the Awami League for its victory. “The Chinese side firmly supports Bangladesh in maintaining peace and stability… non-interference in its internal affairs, and independently choosing a development path suited to its national conditions,” the statement declared.

That support from China came even as protests against the Awami League government gained steam. In fact, Hasina’s controversial comment comparing student protesters to “Razakars,” or traitors – which arguably changed the course of the entire protest movement by galvanizing student anger against her – was made in a press conference ostensibly devoted to discussing her China trip. 

That awkward timing will dent Beijing’s efforts to distance itself from the Awami League now – even if China is far better positioned than India to make the attempt.