U.S. President John F. Kennedy once remarked during a press conference that the prospect of a world made more dangerous with an ever-increasing number of nuclear-armed states haunted him. According to his estimates, if left unregulated, up to 20 states would possess nuclear weapons by 1975. Kennedy’s remarks galvanized a more concerted global endeavor toward disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was subsequently instituted in 1968 to curtail proliferation ambitions and promote disarmament. This was helped by the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. In general, the 1970s was marked not by worrisome proliferation trends but by relatively encouraging signs of disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States.
Although Kennedy did not live to see many of these developments, he would have been heartened that his prophesized pessimistic scenario did not materialize. However, he would likely be equally discouraged by the status of the world at present. Not only has there been an upward trend of proliferation, which the NPT struggles to contain, but arms control treaties have also proven elusive, with the last remaining arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia – New START – set to expire in 2026 with little hope of its extension. The five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, despite repeated positive affirmations that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and affirmed pledges to denuclearize, are currently engaged in modernizing their nuclear stockpiles.
China’s nuclear modernization draws particular concern due to the rate and scale of its nuclear arsenal expansion. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that by 2035 China will possess around 1,500 nuclear warheads – an increase of 1,000 from its present stockpile. This may coincide roughly with the maturation of its nuclear triad modernization program – the H-20 strategic stealth bomber, Type 096 nuclear-armed submarine, and DF-27 hypersonic glide missile may be commissioned into service within the next decade as part of China’s goal to complete military modernization. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has even alleged that China may possess more nuclear weapons than the United States in the future.
To be sure, attempts have been made to engage Beijing in arms control talks. The Trump administration sought to include China as part of its renewal of the New START, arguing that involving China in an arms control agreement would forestall a future three-way arms race. However, the proposed trilateral arms control was flatly rebuffed by China. Beijing maintains the view that given the overwhelming numerical disparity in nuclear warheads between China and the United States or Russia, China should be excluded from any arms control talks until the U.S. and Russia have denuclearized sufficiently.
The Biden administration, seemingly taking heed of Beijing’s reluctance to denuclearize, sought instead to engage China along the theme of risk reduction. While the Biden administration does not diminish the importance of denuclearizing China, more salient issues, such as managing the risks associated with artificial intelligence, instituting a missile launch notification agreement, as well as brokering a “human-in-the-loop” agreement, were given a heavier premium. Although this approach has resulted in several high-level meetings between China and the United States, talks have all but ground to a halt and have lost considerable momentum.
Recent scholarly discussions have probed the possibility that both parties can engage in talks surrounding the “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear posture. It was suggested that U.S. receptivity and willingness to consider adopting an NFU policy – something maintained and repeatedly proposed by China – could spark and inject impetus into China-U.S. strategic dialogues. Proponents have further argued that discussions to clarify and demystify the terms under No First Use could also function as a foundation for more sustained talks on deeper issues of U.S. and China strategic relations. Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart has welcomed the possibility of such discussion, indicating that the United States is open to considering proposals by China on NFU.
Yet, such developments have yet to eventuate, or even prompt serious U.S. interest. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins dismissed a possible shift to an NFU policy, asserting that the United States remains resolute in its present nuclear policy. Beyond criticism that adopting the proposed posture would constrain U.S. strategic options, the lukewarm response also stems from Washington’s cynicism and skepticism toward China’s declaratory policy and its actions. From the U.S. perspective, reconciling China’s stated NFU posture with the expansion of its nuclear arsenal remains implausible. This perceived inconsistency casts doubts on Chinese sincerity, resulting in Washington’s ultimate choice to “not entertain the idea” of No First Use.
Hence, to engage the United States and China in strategic dialogues, a new approach is essential – one that is not overly restrictive but accentuates consistency in implementation and policy. In this regard, the U.S. and China should approach their strategic relations from a “non-weaponized deterrence” perspective.
In brief, non-weaponized deterrence is practiced when states agree not to assemble and deploy nuclear weapons but still retain the materials and capability necessary to construct such weapons should there be a need to. In other words, the credible latent nuclear capability constitutes the core of deterrence, thereby shifting the focus from actual weaponization to a credible but restrained potential.
Applying this logic to the China-U.S. strategic relations, this novel approach permits both states to continue their nuclear modernization programs, albeit under the conditions of not weaponizing it. This approach holds promise for three main reasons. First, it reflects the reality that under the backdrop of an intense security dilemma, a complete stop in nuclear modernization efforts is improbable. Second, the structured form of restraint may mitigate the risks of arms race as it introduces limits and bounds that distinguish latent capability from a nuclear arsenal. This suggests that China can still retain the autonomy to enhance its security without overtly triggering a response. Lastly, by choosing not to weaponize its capability, China can enhance the credibility of its No First Use pledges, thereby proving its sincerity to the United States.
Undoubtedly, further work at the official level is required to integrate the non-weaponized deterrence framework into China-U.S. strategic relations. At the core, several key questions remain: What should be done about the existing U.S. and Chinese stockpiles? Should the stockpiles be included or excluded as part of the agreement? Can such an agreement adopt a quid pro quo structure? How can the agreement be verifiable? These unresolved questions establish potential starting points for China-U.S. dialogues, which the two states can partake in discussions to clarify and explore these specifics as a way forward in establishing a common ground.
By reorienting the focus from active arsenals to latent capabilities, the adoption of a non-weaponized approach acknowledges and affirms the security needs of the United States and China, yet it reduces the immediate nuclear threats while allaying the systemic pressures of a security dilemma. As such, this provides a strategic opening for both Washington and Beijing to prioritize stability over escalation and creates a foundation for sustained dialogue. From that view, adopting a non-weaponized approach may provide hope that an overall more stable relationship between the U.S. and China will ensue, which can then form the base for more substantial discussions and more productive relations.