Strategic competition between China and the United States has become the primary force shaping the contours of world politics. A new dimension has emerged in this titanic clash: an ideological contest to sell the virtues of their respective governance systems through state-sponsored external media.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) runs Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, and China Daily, and spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on the China Global Television Network, which broadcasts in seven languages worldwide to “help foreign people realize that the Chinese Communist Party is capable … and that socialism with Chinese characteristics is good.”
Less well-known is the fact that the U.S. government likewise allocates substantial resources to promote pro-democracy narratives around the world through its broadcasting networks like the U.S. Agency for Global Media, ShareAmerica, and Voice of America.
Over the past decade, there has been no shortage of policy debate over the two superpowers’ influence operations in the battle for global hearts and minds. Many believe that U.S. democratic governance, with its political accountability and “universalistic culture,” is inherently more attractive to audiences worldwide. By contrast, China’s authoritarian politics is often perceived as projecting “a parochial vision of national rejuvenation that has little international appeal.”
In the words of Joshua Kurlantzick, “Despite Beijing pouring money, resources, and time into its media and information efforts, … and despite extensive global news coverage of China’s influence strategies, … Beijing mostly failed.”
Yet, a growing body of policy analysis and scholarly research suggests that the media appeal of Chinese authoritarianism should not be underestimated.
In 2022, I joined a team of researchers at Yale University to conduct a randomized survey experiment across 19 countries on all six inhabited continents: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The surveyed countries represented a comprehensive cross-section of the international community, varying in regime type, public approval of Chinese and U.S. leadership, economic development, and exposure to Chinese aid.
We administered surveys in the local languages, exposing 6,276 global citizens to representative sets of the Chinese and U.S. governments’ real foreign-facing messages touting their respective political and economic systems. The Chinese media samples featured clear source labeling and presented factually accurate information, though with a plain editorial slant.
After analyzing over 20,000 actual media products from Chinese and U.S. state-run media outlets, we first identified distinct external messaging patterns. China’s messaging specifically plays up its accomplishments as a model for other developing countries, whereas U.S. messaging advocates for the general merits of democracy. China’s political videos highlight its responsiveness to domestic needs, showcasing examples like the National People’s Congress addressing popular demands or the CCP’s early success in managing COVID-19. U.S. political videos, on the other hand, talk up abstract virtues like civil liberties, diversity, and other freedoms enjoyable in the United States. China’s economic videos emphasize the CCP’s role in bringing prosperity and raising millions from poverty, as well as infrastructure projects at home and abroad that benefit ordinary citizens. U.S. economic videos focus on promoting entrepreneurship and featuring testimonials to encourage investment.
Next, respondents in each country were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups: one group watched two Chinese-produced videos, another watched two U.S.-produced videos, and a third watched one Chinese and one U.S. video. The fourth placebo group watched two nature videos unrelated to both countries and political economy, which was intended to serve as a baseline for public attitudes before exposure to state media clips.
After watching the videos, respondents indicated their preferences between the political and economic models of China and those of the United States. Respondents also indicated their perceptions of each regime’s performance and democratic values, with performance metrics covering economic growth, leadership competency, political stability, and responsive governance, and democratic metrics covering alternation of political power, democratic governance, freedom of speech, and universal suffrage.
The results from the experiment unveiled the remarkable effectiveness of China’s messaging in promoting its authoritarian governance to a global audience. Contrary to conventional wisdom, China’s state media excelled at boosting international support for its political and economic systems. Notably, compared to the placebo group, exposure to Chinese messages tripled the proportion of respondents who preferred the Chinese political model to its U.S. counterpart, from 16 percent to 54 percent. The exposure also nearly doubled the preference for the Chinese economic model over the U.S. one, raising it from 30 percent to 58 percent.
Although U.S. messaging also had a boosting effect, it consistently fell short compared to its Chinese counterpart. When respondents were exposed to content from both countries, U.S. messaging was found to temper, but not fully counteract, the success of Chinese narratives. In these head-to-head matchups, global audience preferences still shifted toward China, albeit less dramatically (from 16 to 32 percent in the political domain and from 30 to 40 percent in the economic domain). Simply put, China’s influence operations possess a distinct edge in molding global attitudes in its favor.
China’s political and economic system branding resonated most in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America – regions central to its “pragmatic sells” and external media outreach. The allure of the Chinese political system in these regions, however, belies the observation that some audiences in sub-Saharan Africa tend to admire China’s economic achievements but are still inclined toward United States’ democratic political values.
Respondents from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as those from Europe, North America, and Oceania, were among the least receptive to Chinese messaging. Yet, surprisingly, in head-to-head matchups, respondents from advanced democracies in the latter set of regions – namely, Australia, Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom – still collectively preferred China’s political and economic models to those of the United States, suggesting that they may lean toward a responsive form of authoritarian governance even at the expense of democratic principles. This implication looms large in an era characterized by democratic backsliding and the rise of autocracy.
Why does Chinese messaging strike such a chord with global citizens? The research team found that its appeal largely stems from China’s record of political stability, recent improvements in responsive governance, and historic economic growth that is well-known around the world – essentially, the overall strength of the country’s performance. Chinese messaging significantly enhanced respondents’ perceptions of China’s performance and democratic values, while simultaneously undermining perceptions of the U.S. system’s performance. Even when exposed to both Chinese and U.S. media, respondents continued to perceive China’s performance much more favorably, though their perceptions of its democratic attributes were diminished.
Moreover, we found that Chinese-produced messaging exhibits higher production values than its U.S. counterparts. As a leading voice in our research team recently noted, “China’s external influence operations are more sophisticated, effective, and likely to succeed over the long run than many in the West believe. … U.S. messaging is scattershot and less persuasive.” This finding debunks the popular notion that “China has built a giant influence and information apparatus but currently wields it clumsily and often poorly,” and that its media campaigns are “a mix of brutally tedious propaganda and bland documentaries.”
That global public opinion could swing in favor of the Chinese governance model sends a clarion call to the United States – but it does not mean that the U.S. is inevitably headed for a defeat in system branding. While U.S. messaging has the potential to blunt China’s expanding media footprint, winning hearts and minds in the 21st century requires more than broadcasting alone. As many around the world gravitate toward China’s performative governance, the U.S. government should demonstrate its worthiness as a model of emulation to effectively align global citizens with the U.S. system of governance through foreign-directed messaging.
U.S. democratic and liberal ideals remain widely cherished, but their erosion in practice – evident in deep polarization, legislative gridlock, upheavals like the January 6 insurrection, “liberal illiberalism” in U.S. foreign policy, and the unraveling of the U.S.-led liberal international order – has tarnished the attractiveness of overall U.S. governance. The imperative is clear: Washington must bolster U.S. democratic frameworks by rising to today’s intricate challenges, both at home and abroad.