Japan’s snap election on October 27 did not induce much excitement in voters. The turnout rate – 53.85 percent – was the third lowest since 1945. The low energy campaign meant that the ruling Liberal Democratic (LDP) had an advantage, given the tendency of their base to turn out even in scantily attended elections. In the 2014 election that set Japan’s record for low turnout, the LDP-Komeito ruling coalition obtained a supermajority in the Diet. Further benefiting the LDP, with less than a month between the election announcement and polling day, the opposition failed to field unified candidates that could challenge the ruling parties’ candidates one-on-one.
Although the slush fund scandal had engendered headwinds against the LDP, the crowded field of candidates and the voters’ lack of enthusiasm seemed to guarantee the ruling parties’ continuing hold on power, which has been uninterrupted since 2012.
However, on election night, the results showed that although political apathy remains a persistent phenomenon in Japanese politics, the voters did not forgive the culmination of scandals under the current LDP leadership. In the end, 27 out of 44 candidates that were implicated in the slush fund scandal – including individuals that were once touted as prime ministerial material – lost their seats. Compared to 2021, the LDP lost about 5 million votes in the proportional ballots; if we add the drop in votes for Komeito, the total decrease is approximately 6 million.
Most importantly, the LDP-Komeito coalition lost their majority in the Diet. They will have to add another partner to their coalition in order to secure a ruling majority, or govern as a minority government, if they want to stay in power.
There is deep uncertainty in how events will unfold between now and when the newly elected members of the House of Representatives assemble to appoint a new prime minister – a duty that they are obliged to perform within 30 days of the election, according to Article 54 of the Japanese Constitution. The opposition parties have stark differences between them, but have also given strong pronouncements that they will not be a part of the current ruling coalition. It seems possible that Ishiba may carry on as prime minister; at the same time, if the opposition parties are able to sort out their differences, it is theoretically possible that there will be a change of government.
Whatever the end result of the various parties’ coalition building efforts, the hung parliament will have an impact on Japan’s policymaking, both domestic and foreign, moving forward.
In a hung parliament, by definition, “no single political party has enough seats to have total control.” In practical terms, this means that compromise with the opposition would be a must to pass any legislation. Also, the ruling party would be under the ever-present threat of a motion of no-confidence, which, if adopted, will restart the process to choose the leader of the government all over again.
Under these circumstances, there is a chance that the non-LDP members of the Diet cannot only affect domestic policy but also its foreign affairs through the use of their veto power.
In order to understand how the non-LDP majority may shape Japanese diplomacy, it is worthwhile to examine their foreign policy platforms.
One ideological stream – the bulk of the opposition parties – are the “realists,” who argue for a “stable” and “realist” foreign policy while promising continuation from the LDP. Such parties include the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Nippon Ishin no Kai, and the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) – the second, third, and fourth largest parties in the new Japanese parliament. For example, the CDP stated in their campaign manifesto that their goal is to carry out a “Stable Diplomatic and Security Strategy.” Similar to the CDP, by using phrases such as “realistic” or “protecting oneself,” Nippon Ishin and the DPFP implied that the security environment surrounding Japan is deteriorating and some form of self-defense is needed.
Besides the aspect of “realism,” what all three of them have in common – and what differentiates them the most from other marginal parties – is the insistence that they see the Japan-U.S. alliance as a cornerstone of Japanese security. This stance is shared by the LDP government, which is doubling down on further security integration with the United States.
Another group is the “pacifists,” which is represented by traditional leftist parties, such as the Communist Party of Japan and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). They emphasize dialogue over coercive force, and they believe that Japan’s investment in defense capabilities and the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. security alliance both contribute to destabilization in East Asia.
Although the pacifists are a marginal force compared to the realists, they have historically played an important role in restraining Japan’s foreign policy. And since the labor unions (mainly unions for public servants and workers of privatized state-owned enterprise) that used to support the Socialist Party – the spiritual predecessor of the SDP – are now the main base of support for the CDP, they exert some influence over the largest opposition party. New CDP leader Noda Yoshihiko wants the party to be more “realistic,” which is causing some friction with the backbenchers that sympathize with the pacifists.
The final grouping is the nationalists, a label that could be rightly attached to nationalist parties that were ascendant in the latest lower house election, although they are less influential than the old-school pacifists. Parties such as Sanseito and the newly established Conservative Party of Japan – both gaining three seats – have been arguing that Japan should adopt a more assertive and confrontational approach with its foreign policy, particularly against the People’s Republic of China. The nationalists insist that certain barriers, such as the pacifist restrictions in Japan’s constitution, should be overcome to make room for Japan to exert its full potential.
Although Reiwa Shinsengumi – an economically populist leftist party – has a lot in common with the pacifists, as evident by their focus on “dialogue” and “multilateralism,” they criticize the current administration’s foreign policy in a way that resembles that of nationalist parties, describing Japan’s approach toward the United States as “servile diplomacy.”
If there is a change in government it is likely that the realists will be in charge. In that case, the realists have to gain support from the pacifists and nationalists, who may disagree with their foreign policy approaches.
At the moment it seems unlikely that enough opposition parties would be able to join forces and form a governing coalition that will be able to best the larger numbers that the LDP and Komeito have. Even if the non-LDP parties succeed in forming a coalition, the LDP-Komeito majority still holds the upper house, meaning that an opposition-led government would have to deal with a split Diet. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the contours of the foreign policy discourse within the Japanese Diet. In the new hung parliament, all parties have the potential to directly or indirectly affect the course of Japanese foreign policy
For example, regardless of all of their vast differences, what all the opposition parties have in common is their objection to tax hikes as a source of financing the defense budget. The LDP has pledged to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, but that will require upping government revenues. The LDP was supposed to decide on when the so-called defense tax hikes will take place by the end of this year.
However, the lack of a majority for the LDP-Komeito coalition could impose significant hurdles on their initial plan and enable the opposition to try to pass bills that may hinder its momentum. If such circumstances unfold, it will force the government to seek an alternative source of revenue, which may delay the entire process of the defense build up.
The lower house election result has challenged the stable majority that the LDP-Komeito ruling coalition had protected in both houses since 2013. With Japan entering a whole different political landscape, even the participants appear to be uncertain of how to navigate through it. At least for now, the Japanese opposition parties that were long marginalized and basically ignored by the ruling bloc now have the power to thwart the government’s agenda or cast the decisive vote in future legislative battles.