For most people the third time’s the charm, but not for Ishiba Shigeru. After four attempts of becoming the president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – in 2008, 2012, 2018, and 2021 – Ishiba finally achieved his longtime goal on his fifth try, which he declared was his “last fight.” Four days after his ascension to party leader, he obtained the ultimate prize on October 1: becoming the prime minister of Japan.
Throughout his career, what has distinguished Ishiba as a politician – and the same reason why he was distanced from power for a decade – is his willingness to speak out against the authorities, including his superiors. As a junior member of the Diet, Ishiba left the LDP in protest of the mounting corruption scandals that marred the party then, but he rejoined the party once his idealism for political change was defeated. Even after he became influential enough to be appointed to a Cabinet post, he was prone to openly criticizing the individuals that appointed him – notably Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro – calling for both former prime ministers to step down when the public turned their backs on them.
Ishiba formed an uneasy alliance with Abe following the 2012 LDP leadership race and became the LDP secretary general, the number two position in the party. Even so, in 2014 he clashed with Abe over the security legislation and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, causing consternation within the LDP and further deteriorating his relationship with Abe. Ishiba’s ties to the party mainstream were all but severed after he challenged Abe in the 2018 leadership race, when Ishiba was defeated resoundingly.
However, now Ishiba is no longer an outcast of his party – he is the prime minister. And he is showing his long-standing willingness to talk openly about issues where he has been out of step with the bulk of his party, including an inclination to speak up to his country’s foremost ally, something that previous Japanese leaders were long reluctant to do.
Ishiba has been arguing for revisions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japan-U.S. Status of Force Agreement (SOFA), both of which have been untouched since 1960. Other unique positions that he has advocated include stationing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) on U.S. soil, and the joint use of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa by U.S. and Japanese forces. At his first press conference as prime minister Ishiba doubled down on his past comments and stressed the merit of his proposals, which he said would strengthen the bilateral relationship.
The demands that Ishiba has toward the United States are a reflection of his desire for more reciprocity in the alliance. It is reported that the 2004 helicopter accident at Okinawa International University – an incident where a U.S. helicopter crashed into a local university facility – strongly impacted Ishiba’s view of the state of the alliance. Even though the helicopter crash took place on Japanese soil, no Japanese authority was allowed to enter the scene of the accident while the U.S. military police conducted their inspection and gathered the fragments of the object – an act permitted under the SOFA. Reflecting upon the incident 20 years later, Ishiba implied that it had challenged his assumption that Japan was a “sovereign nation.” His particular interest in revising the SOFA during and after the LDP leadership race shows how central the issue is to him.
Prior to becoming prime minister, Ishiba published an op-ed on the website of the Hudson Institute, a U.S. think tank, in an effort to bring his case for reciprocity to the attention of U.S. policymakers. In his pitch, he described the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as an “asymmetrical bilateral treaty” and argued that Japan “must have its own military strategy and become independent in terms of security,” which will allow Japan to collaborate “on equal terms with the U.S.”
But an appeal for reciprocity does not necessarily mean that Ishiba wants to weaken his country’s ties with the United States; in fact he wants to strengthen these and believes that the reforms that he proposes will achieve such ends. In his op-ed for the Hudson Institute, Ishiba called it his “mission to raise the Japan-U.S. alliance to the level of the U.S.-U.K. alliance.”
His resolve to alter the “status quo” of the Japan-U.S. alliance is often accompanied by his remarks that it will be positive for not only Japan, but also for the United States. At the same press conference where he stressed the need to reconsider SOFA, Ishiba also argued that doing so will “help strengthen” the Japan-U.S. alliance. In his piece for the Hudson Institute, he stated that his measures will enhance the deterrence capabilities of the United States and Japan, while reducing “the burden on U.S. forces in Japan.”
Ishiba’s desire to strengthen ties with the United States is derived from his understanding of Japan’s deteriorating security environment in East Asia, a view shared by many security experts in Japan and gradually disseminated among the general public. However, although Ishiba believes that the United States is a crucial ally for Japan’s defense, he is not so sure whether Japan can rely on Washington alone. That is the reason why he is clinging to the idea of an “Asian NATO.”
The feasibility of such a defense mechanism seems small – a fact that Ishiba also acknowledges – since it would be aimed at confronting China, a stance that the bulk of Asian nations refuse to take. However, the basic idea of an “Asian NATO” appears to suit his dual goals for a Japan that will have more reciprocity with the United States – as a nation that has more leverage and veto power within an “Asian NATO” – and an enlarged deterrence – as a result of the combined forces of nations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Ishiba’s proposals appear to be worthy of consideration from the viewpoint of Japanese security. Revising the Japan-U.S. SOFA – even just as a symbolic gesture – may allow the Japanese government to tamp down the local opposition in Okinawa over the construction of a new U.S. base. As it stands, it Okinawan discontent is left unresolved it may impose significant hurdles for operations at the pre-existing bases. Also Ishiba’s idea for joint usage of the military bases by U.S. and Japanese forces – and also a Japanese base in the United States – will further integrate the two nations together; enabling a robust deterrence and allowing the two militaires to collaborate seamlessly should hostilities commence.
Although Ishiba’s ideas have a practical basis, Washington – the intended recipient of his message – seems puzzled by these sudden overtures. Equally confused are the Japanese press, who are wary of the possibility that Ishiba’s comments may become a “source of friction” with the United States.
Ishiba’s outspokenness helped him win over the approval of the public, despite weak support from his colleagues within the Diet. However, the same outspokenness that made him successful within Japan would not ensure his success in foreign policy. The art of diplomacy requires gradual negotiation and compromises, and the mutual trust that will yield actual results cannot be built in a day.
What Ishiba is saying may be correct, but being right is no guarantee of winning friends both domestically and internationally – something Ishiba must know, since his willingness to voice unpopular truths has made him at times his own worst enemy.