Xi Jinping has transformed China, and China’s transformation has in turn changed the world. Since Xi took charge in 2012, China has grown enormously in geopolitical power, with its global influence finally catching up to its eye-watering growth in the first decade of the 21st century. In pursuing what he terms the “China Dream,” Xi made marked departures from the policies and norms established by his predecessors.
In his newly released book, “On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World,” Kevin Rudd, former Australian prime minister and current Australian ambassador to the United States, sets out to understand why Xi “has decided to turn much of Chinese politics, economics, and foreign policy on its head from the decades of Communist Party rule that preceded him.”
Rudd characterizes Xi’s ideological framework as “Marxist-Leninist nationalism” epitomized by a move to the left in economic and political thinking paired with a significant step to the right when it comes to Chinese nationalism. Ideology may not be the only force that has animated Xi’s decisions, but it plays a critical role in where Xi has taken China, and where he dreams China will go in the future.
In the following interview Rudd details Xi’s ideological vision, what it tells us about China, and what it means for the world.
In what ways does Xi’s ideology differ from that of his predecessors?
Deng, Jiang, and Hu defined the central challenge (or “contradiction”) facing the CCP as the need to unleash the factors of production to boost the people’s livelihood and the country’s wealth. Xi has redefined the central challenge as rectifying the imbalances of economic development that have emerged over previous decades under his predecessors, including economic inequality and the problems of social class.
Second, Xi has relocated the party to become the center of all things – political, economic, military, social, and academic – rather than allowing a professional class of technocrats to run each domain as in the recent ideological past.
Third, Xi has embraced a nationalist ideology that argues the time has come to challenge the U.S.-led order. This is opposed to simply working within it to pursue China’s long-standing economic development objectives, and maximize access to global markets and capital and technology flows.
You’ve sketched out Xi’s ideology as “Marxist Nationalism.” How does Xi navigate the apparent contradictions between Chinese nationalism, a deep pride in Chinese history and culture, and the decidedly not Chinese Marxist-Leninist model?
Xi has embraced a campaign to both “sinify” and “modernize” Chinese Marxism. He calls this the “second integration.” Mao began this process (according to Xi) by embracing non-Soviet and non-classically-Marxist concepts like peasant-led, as opposed to proletarian-led, revolution.
Xi now seeks to take this “sinification” process further by incorporating relevant language and concepts from China’s classical tradition into modern Chinese Marxism. Xi also further foreshadows integrating elements of world cultures into the Chinese Marxist framework in order to present a new form of Marxism that could appeal to the Global South.
Finally the purpose of the Chinese revolution in CCP history has always been (at least in large part) to build a strong Chinese nation and state. Xi’s argument is that only the CCP, as a Marxist-Leninist party, is capable of achieving that mission – and that all other models failed.
Why was 2023 such a significant year when it comes to understanding the trajectory of Xi Jinping’s China?
2023 saw two major developments in China. The first was the failure of the Chinese economy to recover its pre-COVID economic growth levels. Xi’s ideological settings had disincentivized the Chinese private sector and foreign investor confidence. This was when the economic cost of Xi’s ideological experiment began to become fully apparent.
The second was the decision to stabilize the U.S.-China relationship in November 2023 at the Xi-Biden summit at San Francisco, notwithstanding the balloon incident earlier in the year. While this was largely a tactical rather than strategic move, its rationale appears to lie in providing the Chinese system sufficient political and policy space to rebuild the Chinese growth model.
Given how much Xi has evolved Chinese ideology since Mao, how durable is Xi’s own ideology?
Xi has significantly moved the ideological needle – making China more Leninist, more Marxist, and more nationalist. In doing so, many party members who grew up and flourished professionally under previous Dengist ideological assumptions have been alienated.
It is an open question whether Xi’s framework is therefore durable for the long term – i.e. beyond his term in office, however long that may be. I estimate it would take another 20 years of Xi-ism for it to become fully entrenched in the ranks of CCP, given the youthful age of those who have known no previous system. That would require Xi in turn to be in office until he was approaching 90.
In 1957, Mao remarked: “I believe the east wind is prevailing over the west wind.” Later Chinese leaders, including Xi, have also stated views regarding the apparent decline of the West. What role does the presumption of Western decline play in Chinese ideology?
This is a judgment derived from both historical and dialectical materialism. And it is projected internally by Xi’s party as being “objectively correct.” It reinforces the nationalist view that Chinese national power, augmented by a strong Marxist-Leninist state, is now reaching a tipping point in its ability to engineer new international outcomes – outcomes that are more compatible with Chinese national interests and its Marxist-Leninist values. In other words, it boosts the party’s political self-confidence as it concludes the West is increasingly made up of “paper tigers.”
What do you think analysts miss or misunderstand most often when assessing Chinese foreign policy?
First: the ideological framework within which the Chinese system uses its Marxist-Leninist analytical tools to conclude the current status of the balance of power (through the concept of “comprehensive national power”) and the level of Western political resolve.
Second: the resulting level of ideological self-confidence that history is now on China’s side.
And third: while ideology is not the only predictor of policy change in China, it is a significant factor in shaping change across both policy and behavior. These three factors contribute to a new level of foreign policy self-confidence, notwithstanding slower economic growth.