In mid-December, a 7.3-magnitude earthquake and a series of powerful aftershocks collapsed buildings and triggered mudslides around Port Vila, killing at least 14 and injuring hundreds. Occurring at the start of a much-needed tourist season, the earthquake was another blow to disaster-prone and politically turbulent Vanuatu.
In response, China announced a million-dollar infusion of emergency assistance. The embassy heralded a whole-of-presence effort, including the assistance of in-country experts from Chinese companies, emergency treatment from a Chinese medical team on rotation in Vanuatu, and an additional $100,000 donation from the Red Cross Society of China. On December 30, four Chinese earthquake engineering experts arrived in Port Vila, the first post-disaster assessment team China has sent to a Pacific Island country.
The million dollars China is sending falls short of the World Bank’s $12 million fast-tracked grant, the Asian Development Bank’s $5 million, and Australia’s promised $4-million-plus. That said, China is often credited with leveraging the publicity surrounding its assistance so effectively that it generates an outsized impression.
The United States, whose newly opened embassy was badly damaged in the quake, is sending $250,000 and a USAID team to Vanuatu, where it keeps relief supplies pre-positioned. Much of U.S. assistance to Vanuatu flows through multilateral institutions like the World Bank, though USAID cited the direct funding as part of continued U.S. support that demonstrates a deepening in relations.
When it comes to development aid for the Pacific, Australia is the faraway leader, but China has made significant inroads as a newcomer. Beijing’s foreign development assistance in the region went from zero to more than $1 billion in the span of a decade. Its aid pattern suggests a strategic focus on expanding relations with a set of select high-priority countries – including Vanuatu. From 2015 to 2022, China accounted for an estimated 8 percent of the region’s official development financing but some 24 percent of total aid to Vanuatu, surpassing Australia in some years.
Where economic ties and financial assistance lead, diplomatic and security agreements tend to follow.
In July 2024, China handed over the keys to a new presidential palace in Port Vila, one of a complex of Chinese-constructed government buildings. Shortly after, Beijing welcomed Vanuatu’s prime minister for an official state visit and meeting with Xi Jinping. As an “upgrade” to their previous comprehensive strategic partnership, China and Vanuatu pledged to “jointly build a China-Vanuatu community with a shared future in the new era,” pulling from the phrasebook of official “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” For its part of the bargain, Vanuatu staunchly supports Beijing’s position on issues related to human rights, the South China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
The presidential palace was a present, but most of the infrastructure in the so-called jointly-built community is paid for with loans. Official development assistance calculations count both grants and loans. Of the two nations giving the most to Vanuatu, Australia is the country’s largest benefactor, and China is its largest creditor.
Globally, Vanuatu ranks in the top 10 China-indebted countries in GDP terms, a balance sheet that puts Vanuatu at high risk for debt distress in the IMF’s estimation. An analysis from the Lowy Institute argued that the true picture is even grimmer, making it likely that Vanuatu will not be able to repay what it owes. In other countries, China has used unsustainable debt levels as leverage for strategic gain in a pattern two Harvard scholars have called “debtbook diplomacy.”
As it builds swathes of Pacific Island infrastructure, Beijing seeks deeper bilateral security cooperation, angling for a larger military presence in the region. In 2023, China sent police teams to Vanuatu during a period of political turbulence, making Vanuatu one of several Pacific Island countries to host Chinese police. China has given military aid to all four Pacific Island countries with standing militaries; Vanuatu’s small mobile force received the smallest amount, with the bulk focused on training and delivery of non-lethal equipment alongside a collection of military vehicles.
Conveniently, the wharf China funded in Port Vila is big enough to handle warships. In October 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sent its new guided missile destroyer – reportedly the first deployment of its kind in the South Pacific, reviving old rumors about an agreement to allow a permanent PLA presence in Vanuatu. Such an agreement allegedly would have built incrementally, beginning with access agreements allowing PLAN ships to dock to refuel, as the destroyers did.
Major nations often turn to their militaries to lend a hand with evacuations and supply delivery after natural disasters. After Vanuatu’s earthquake, Australia, New Zealand, and France all called in military planes to help with relief.
To date, there is no sign of the PLA in China’s delivery of earthquake aid, but Beijing is increasingly linking its foreign aid and military presence in both policy and practice. A 2015 State Council white paper on China’s military strategy committed the PLA to actively participate in international disaster rescue and humanitarian aid efforts, activities that would allow the armed forces to “enhance their own capabilities and expertise.” Experts call it an effort to normalize China’s military presence in the region through nonmilitary activities, or a way to develop the capabilities and infrastructure for a global conflict.
In 2022, the PLA was part of China’s post-disaster aid efforts in Tonga. In August 2023, a PLA Navy hospital ship arrived in Port Vila for a weeklong stay, providing medical services and conducting exchanges on a Pacific Island goodwill tour.
China’s aid to Vanuatu, while civilian, goes partway to the multifaceted disaster relief effort the white paper authors envisioned. Sending its first post-disaster assessment team to the Pacific Islands brings China closer to other nations’ expert search-and-rescue and emergency response teams.
Disaster relief aid offers a chance to make inroads both diplomatic and military. When future disasters strike Pacific Island countries that Beijing has identified as central to its strategic priorities, we can expect China to aim for the kind of broader, civil-military assistance that other major global donors offer.