Vietnam has rarely had a buzzword to describe its grand strategy, but now the “era of national rise” has taken a central place in the country’s political discourse. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) conceptualizes it as a “strategic plan to accelerate economic growth, innovation, and global influence” in service of national progress. Besides the domestic ramifications of the era of national rise, the concept also signals an assertion of Vietnam’s agency on the international stage. Of course, the country’s foreign policy is still built on the “Four Nos” principle, that it says no to military alliances, no to siding with one country against another, no to foreign military bases and using Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries, and no to using force or threatening to use force in international relations.
However, if the “Four Nos” emphasize Vietnam not doing things that it deems counterproductive to its national interest, the “era of national rise” signals that Vietnam will be actively doing things to increase its international profile. CPV General Secretary To Lam has made clear that the years between 2025 and 2030 would be crucial to shaping a new international order. Vietnam should prepare itself for this “turning point” and it could no longer be a bystander to international politics.
What Vietnam is planning to do is not yet certain, but one of the clearest indicators is that the country is looking to host many summits of global importance – potentially between the U.S. and Russian presidents, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin – based on its experience hosting one between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019. The country is also pushing to have as many international conventions signed in Vietnam, like the recently signed United Nations Convention on Cybercrime in Hanoi. By affirming its neutrality, Hanoi wants to be a reliable partner and conduit to all the major powers in solving international crises by taking the initiative to get them to strike a deal with each other. In short, Vietnam will say yes more.
While the “era of national rise” discourse is new, the aspiration is not. Fifty years ago, a victorious CPV proclaimed the same ambition. In his victory speech in May 1975, CPV First Secretary Le Duan also proclaimed and welcomed a new era of Vietnam’s history, that Vietnam, having defeated the United States and unified the country, was poised to “rise to the new heights of the time.” The CPV assessed that the international balance of force was in its favor, as imperialism was retrenching, and communism was rising. Vietnam thus affirmed its neutrality in international politics and was open to normalizing ties with every country on the basis of mutual respect with the goal of building peace. With its newfound strength, Vietnam would no longer be a bystander to international politics. The country subsequently rejected picking a side in the Sino-Soviet Split, and it joined the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations in August 1976 and September 1977, respectively.
Unfortunately, although a unified Vietnam had the domestic strength to usher in a new era, it lacked the international foundation to do so. Hanoi proclaimed its aspiration at the wrong moment, as China had long been skeptical of Hanoi’s post-unification ambition with respect to Indochina and the Khmer Rouge refused to accept Vietnamese leadership. From their perspectives, Hanoi’s avowed contribution to regional peace and assertation of a new role in international relations were a smokescreen for regional domination. Vietnam had to delay its post-war reconstruction to deal militarily with the Chinese and Khmer Rouge threats. Vietnam’s post-unification domestic strength could not offset the negative international response to its rise. The country’s living standard during the 1980s was one of the worst in the world, and the CPV-led government was seen as an international pariah despite having rescued the Cambodian people from the genocidal Khmer Rouge. It was this untimely assertation of agency that prompted Vietnam to adopt its “Three Nos” policy in 1998 (a fourth “no” was added in 2019), to assure China that Vietnam would restrain its agency to avoid repeating the mistake. Saying yes at the wrong time was costly.
The Vietnam of 2025 thus has much to learn from the Vietnam of 1975. First, it is within Vietnam’s sovereign right to proclaim its ambition, but it must carefully gauge current trends and decide if doing so would be to the liking of other countries. Currently, Vietnam has leveraged its burgeoning network of partnerships to legitimize its rise, but the international order is entering a period of growing uncertainty due to the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. Hanoi’s network of partnerships will only be stable so long as Vietnam is not forced to pick a side between the two superpowers. Vietnam in the immediate post-Vietnam War years did not want to pick a side, but its security needs forced Hanoi to side with the Soviet Union against China. Such a decision completely undermined Hanoi’s goal of adopting a neutral foreign policy.
Hanoi may see an opportunity to elevate its international profile by brokering talks as U.S.-China or U.S.-Russia ties deteriorate, but there is no guarantee that these countries will refrain from forcing Hanoi to pick a side if their relations deteriorate further. Inserting itself into a great-power quarrel may prove counterproductive if the great powers misperceive Hanoi’s efforts as picking one side over the other. The lesson of the 2019 Trump-Kim summit is that success is not always guaranteed, and the host country may suffer from summit failures too. Vietnam has a small margin of error, and it may be more beneficial to say no most of the time than to say yes.
Second, Vietnam’s domestic capacity is getting stronger, but that does not mean that Vietnam has become a country with great agency on the international stage. Vietnam is still a small power with limited resources that is subject to great-power quarrels, and these unfavorable material conditions cannot be changed with a network of partnerships. Vietnam’s era of national rise relies on continuing economic growth at the current pace, which requires a peaceful external environment. The Vietnam of 1975 was arguably the strongest the country had ever been since 1945, but such a stature was not enough to reverse the anti-Vietnam sentiment that soon emerged across the Asia-Pacific. Post-Cold War Vietnam has been able to develop economically thanks to Hanoi’s successful efforts to end international sanctions and isolation. The international environment will continue shaping Hanoi’s choices despite its aspiration to assert itself more and it will determine whether Vietnam’s rise will be successful.
Finally, because of its limited resources, Vietnam needs to have a clear understanding of what it really needs. Continental security, or a secure land border with China, Laos, and Cambodia must always come first. Any interest beyond that is not vital to national survival and is subject to compromise if Vietnam cannot stretch its resources further. After overthrowing the Khmer Rouge and installing a new Cambodian government in January 1979, Vietnam successfully secured its land border as the Khmer Rouge could no longer launch attacks into Vietnamese territory. However, Hanoi’s decision to undertake a massive nation-building project backed by an occupation force of 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia thereafter was one of the main factors contributing to its economic woes and pariah status during the 1980s. Doing more than necessary ended up being counterproductive.
It is not surprising that once Hanoi withdrew from Cambodia in 1989 and signed the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, its international prospects began to improve.
Vietnam will be tempted to say yes more often to undertaking new international obligations beyond its immediate interest to complement its rise, but it should also develop plans to scale back if its resources no longer permit. If imperial overstretch can bring down a great power, Vietnam will not be an exception if it fails to match ends and means.
The complexity of balancing Vietnam’s limited agency with the uncertainty of international politics may explain why Vietnam has not made any substantial changes to its foreign policy or laid out a comprehensive foreign policy agenda for the “era of national rise.” For now, the focus of the rise is on the domestic sphere, coupled with an affirmation of the “Four Nos.” However, it is never too late to foresee the pitfalls if Vietnam fails to handle the international aspect of its rise. The Vietnam of 1975 failed to grasp the prospect, and its aspiration was delayed by 50 years. The Vietnam of 2025 can do better, and it must.
