On February 23, German voters came out in record numbers for federal elections – the turnout of 82.5 percent was the highest since German reunification in 1990. The increased turnout, up from 76.6 percent in 2021, was a sign of the high stakes for Germany, both politically and economically.
The Conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Friedrich Merz, and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), won the most votes with 28.6 percent. The far-right party Alternative for Germany (commonly known as AfD) stood second with 20.8 percent votes, more than double its 10.3 percent vote share in the last elections. The extremist party also received support from Elon Musk, which drew huge criticism in Germany.
Outgoing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) managed to get only 16.4 percent of votes, its worst performance since 1945. The Greens, part of the outgoing “Traffic Light Coalition” government, won 11.4 percent.
The Left Party, which saw the largest gains after the AfD, stood fifth with 8.8 percent of the voting share. That represented a massive gain for the far-left party, which was polling at just under 3 percent five months before the election.
No other party managed to cross the 5 percent threshold to enter the German parliament, Bundestag – including the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP), which had been part of the “Traffic Light Coalition” before its departure last November, leading to political turmoil that resulted in February’s snap elections.
Since none of the parties managed to win a simple majority to form a federal government, the next German government will also be a coalition government led by Merz and the CDU.
While the election campaigns mainly focused on the issues of migration and the economy, China was also part of the election manifestoes of all the major parties. What do the election results mean for China-Germany relations?
As chancellor, Merz is expected to be tough on China. He has repeatedly proved himself to be a harsh critic of Beijing. In particular, Mercz criticized outgoing Chancellor Scholz’s decision to approve of the Chinese state-owned shipping company Cosco investing in Hamburg’s port in 2023. At the time, as the opposition leader of the German Parliament, Merz had said that Scholz believed in the theory of bringing change through trade and “he lacks the willingness to reassess the risks we are exposed to.” That suggests Merz will seek to recalibrate Germany’s traditional approach to China.
During the election campaign, Merz asked businesses to invest in China with caution, saying it comes with great risk. Moreover, while outlining his future foreign policy, he depicted a scenario resembling the Cold War where, in order to survive, the liberal democracies will have to fight an “axis of autocracies” led by China and Russia.
In addition to Merz’s own comments, the CDU party’s manifesto also pledged to reduce Germany’s dependency on China, while not jettisoning economic relations altogether. Using the buzzword “de-risking” from Germany’s strategy on China, the CDU said that its government would de-risk from China but in the right way:
We want to maintain close economic relations with China, provided they are based on the principle of reciprocity. At the same time, we will reduce critical economic dependencies, for example, through greater diversification of sales markets, raw material sources and supply chains as well as the protection of critical infrastructure and security-relevant technology.
The CDU also wants to compete with China abroad by creating great opportunities for technologies from Germany. It wants to intensify economic relations with Africa and the entire Global South and the Asia-Pacific region “so as not to leave the field to China and Russia.” Thus, a CDU-led government might lead to a tough China policy in the coming months.
The reality, nevertheless, might be different, since the CDU does not have a simple majority to form the next federal government. Therefore, it is required to form a coalition with other parties in the German parliament. Since it has ruled out forming a coalition with the AfD, the most likely coalition will be formed between the CDU and SPD; they have already begun talks to that end. Thus, Germany’s future China policy will also depend on the coalition partner’s stance on China.
Scholz, SPD’s chancellor candidate, during his term as the German chancellor, was strongly influenced by German firms that heavily invested in China, and thus were both risk-averse and susceptible to Beijing’s threats. The party manifesto takes a rather balanced stance on China and considers Beijing to be a difficult partner and, at the same time, an important one, “without whose cooperation global challenges such as climate change, arms control and nuclear non-proliferation issues as well as the debt crisis in countries of the Global South cannot be solved.” Nonetheless, the SPD also promoted economic independence from China – a policy aligned with the CDU.
Despite this firm stance, meaningfully reducing Germany’s dependency on China will likely not be an easy task for the CDU-SPD coalition. Although both parties agree on the need to “de-risk,” the reality is more complex than the election rhetoric. Additionally, U.S. President Donald Trump’s attempts to weaken the EU and potential plans for tariffs against European countries could leave the German government in a vulnerable position, further impacting its already struggling economy. Therefore, it is likely that the next German federal coalition will pursue a more balanced approach to its China policy than it would seem from the election manifestoes.