China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

The case of CMEC and other Chinese business activities in Myanmar show how exposed China is to escalating conflict risks, and offer insight to the role it is playing in the ongoing civil war. 

As the military junta loses ground, Beijing's concern about the fate of Chinese assets and personnel inside the country is growing.

Growing political turbulence, especially in the northern part of Shan State, has drastically narrowed the chances of progress on a host of large-scale projects.

Beijing's overriding goal is to restore the stability necessary to allow integrative infrastructure projects to proceed.

Wang Xiaohong's talks with senior junta officials took place after a resistance offensive overran junta positions across the northern part of Shan State.

Qin Gang paid his first visit to Myanmar on May 2, during which he pledged to increase Chinese economic engagement with the military regime.

Work on the long-planned Muse-Kyaukphyu line is once again inching forward, but construction is likely many years off.

After some initial hesitation, China is moving CMEC ahead in tandem with Myanmar’s military rulers – at least where the situation is stable enough to do so.

The vague plan would see mainland Southeast Asian countries contribute to the flagship Chinese infrastructure initiative.

China’s endorsement of the junta lays the basis for a boom in trade with the fractious eastern state – or so Beijing hopes.

The military coup of February 2021 has opened up new avenues of collaboration between Myanmar and China.

Sun Guoxiang's surreptitious visit marks China's full return to "business as usual" in Myanmar.

The opening of the Chengdu-Lincang line will further mainland Southeast Asia's historic reorientation toward the north.

After Chinese factories were damaged during anti-coup protests, an editorial warned that “China won't allow its interests to be exposed to further aggression."

There is little reason to doubt Beijing's claim that the coup and ensuing crisis is "not what China wants to see.”

China will stick to its strict policy of non-intervention, but the military takeover has created a diplomatic headache for Beijing.

Beijing continues to focus on deepening its physical integration with the Southeast Asian nations to its south.

The foreign minister’s trip was about much more than COVID-19 vaccines.

Infrastructure is high on China's agenda in Myanmar, but it is also making headway in other important sectors.

A long-running war and COVID-19 muddle development in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar.

Yang Jiechi's visit is a sign of the complications China faces in advancing its strategic interests in Myanmar.

Xi’s visit bolstered China-Myanmar ties, but the West can still compete.

Beijing’s influence in Myanmar permeates multiple levels of engagement between the two neighbors.

Naypyidaw picks up the pace on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as other options for FDI fade away.