India-Myanmar

The appeal came days before the Indian prime minister met junta leader Gen Min Aung Hlaing in Bangkok.

“No bridge, road, port, or rail line can connect a people divided by communalism or other ethnic fissures… One cannot build strategic connectivity while fostering social divisions.”

An Indian delegation met a delegation of the Arakan Army recently. Does it signal a shift in India’s approach to Myanmar?

India’s junta-focused diplomacy and lack of abiding relationships with armed groups in Myanmar have limited its response to the fluid situation in the war-torn country.

The political landscape in the country has shifted. New Delhi now needs to adjust its own approach.

India must distinguish itself from China and cut the Myanmar army loose.

Moscow is now a major player both in India’s west and east, compounding the country’s Russia dilemma.

While New Delhi’s approach toward its Southeast Asian neighbor was once shaped by its commitment to democratic values, realpolitik now rules the roost.

The naval visit last week again focused attention on the role of India and China in the Southeast Asian state, even though New Delhi’s weakness lies more in non-security realms.

A recent interaction by the two countries should be understood as part of broader trends underway in the bilateral relationship and the wider region.

A closer look at the context behind a land border crossing agreement that was approved this week.

The drills are focused on peacekeeping operations.

General Bipin Rawat is on a four-day trip to Naypyidaw to boost defense ties.

A closer look at Naypyidaw’s dream of acquiring the capability.

A visit by a Myanmar Navy delegation to India is just the latest sign of deepening defense cooperation between both sides.

New Delhi’s operation is much less novel or controversial than some have claimed.

In balancing its relations with China and India, Myanmar is continuing a well-established practice.