Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

The new Coast Guard cooperation among the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan is a crucial step in building a resilient and unified front in the Indo-Pacific. 

The Philippines is not replacing India in the Quad, but India’s hesitancy on the security agenda in the region in hopes of not triggering China dilutes the Quad’s focus.

As the world navigates an increasingly complex health security landscape, the Quad presents an opportunity for collaboration. 

With U.S. domestic politics calling President Biden home early, the Quad capitalized on their visits to Hiroshima for the G-7 to meet on May 20.

It is relatively easy to establish coalitions to work on non-traditional security issues, but nurturing a group to focus on security issues as the core is not easy, especially for countries like India.

There is a lot riding on the relationship for both New Delhi and Canberra given that both have a inherent interest in balancing China and ensuring a stable Indo-Pacific strategic order.

New defense and security cooperation efforts are springing up across the Indo-Pacific, between some Quad members and those outside the grouping.

Given continuing tensions with China, India will seek to expand its military engagements and security consultations with the Quad.

Writing new rules of the road for critical and emerging technologies is a key imperative for the Quad.

Will expanding Quad’s agenda strengthen the position of the grouping, or weaken its cohesion?

The latest Quad meeting underscored continued growth, but when will the four countries seriously confront the matter of direct security cooperation?

There are clear differences between India and the rest of the Quad, but it is also evident they are willing to work together to resolve those differences. 

Is the time ripe for the U.S. to formalize an intelligence-sharing network with Quad partners Australia, Japan, and India?

Contradictions in the India-Russia relationship, rooted in China and the Quad, will be difficult to overcome in the long term.

Growing space security threats are proving to be a challenge for existing global governance measures, but consensus on new rules is proving difficult.

Trade, investment, and supply chain security need to be high on the agenda of the four-nation grouping.

Countries across Southeast Asia do not wish to be pushed into choosing sides when their economic futures depend on maintaining positive ties with China and the United States.

Australia is back for the second year in a row, underscoring the Quad’s deepening commitment to cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Through deepening maritime partnerships, the Quad nations can amplify their mutual naval power in the Indo-Pacific.

Delhi is taking space cooperation with each of its Quad partners to new heights.

The Quad that the U.S. is now cultivating is focused on what they seek to achieve, not merely what they want to counter.

If the U.S. can seek cooperation without pushing South Korea directly into the U.S.-China crossfire, why not take that path? 

As the U.S. and its allies move forward, what will China do?

Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.