U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. alliance network is its greatest advantage in the competition with China. But Washington can hardly count on its allies if it treats them worse than the way it treats its systemic rival.

During this sensitive time of Seoul’s political turmoil, Blinken’s much-awaited visit to South Korea is the last gift that the Biden administration wants to offer its ally. 

The strongest lesson to be drawn from Trump’s time in the Oval Office is that he has the ability to subvert predictions. 

Having checked China in Asia, the Biden administration will be a hard act to follow, particularly given regional governments' skepticism of Trump.

China is the biggest factor behind the continued development of the U.S. alliance network – a trend that works independently of, and supersedes, any political dynamics in Washington.

The two sides will find it increasingly difficult to avoid intense security competition over the coming decades, but there are still meaningful choices to make.

Different threat perceptions as well as Japan’s colonization of Korea and atrocities committed during World War II have made even basic trilateral cooperation difficult – until now. 

For Moscow, AUKUS is a threat to the delicate balance in the Asia-Pacific – a region that is crucial to Russia’s economic plans and foreign policy strategy.

Insights from Liselotte Odgaard.

Inter-regional solidarity in the face of aggression is welcome. But there are hard limits to hard commitments outside of a country’s home region.

A mutually assured deterrence could be an alternative diplomatic strategy toward Pyongyang.

The Biden administration took some bold steps to empower its Indo-Pacific allies and partners in 2021. But can it deliver on its promises?

One year into the Biden administration, what should we make of its policy toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific?

The current effort – including AUKUS and the Quad – is missing three critical ingredients compared to early efforts in Cold War Europe.

A recent KEI-YouGov survey indicates most Americans support the South Korea-U.S. alliance and see crucial U.S. interests at stake in East Asia.

Australia’s strategic location makes its deployment of SSNs a much greater asset to broader Western interests than if other U.S. allies did the same.

Washington must sharpen its focus on strengthening the regional order-defending agendas of its Indo-Pacific alliances.

While the disaster unfolding in Afghanistan will have many negative consequences, it will not by itself cause the end of U.S. strategic pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific region.

No U.S. ally is going to become the next North Korea. That’s a thin excuse for a new U.S. nuclear buildup.

The leaders of South Korea, Japan, and Australia all called the former vice president to discuss future cooperation on issues like the pandemic and climate change.

With the unwinding of the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), the utility of Washington’s oldest alliance in the Indo-Pacific hangs in the balance.

If the Trump administration is going to insist on putting a dollar value on the costs of the alliance, it should also consider the gains in monetary terms.

Pulling out of the intelligence sharing agreement with Japan will only hurt Korea's security.

A look at the geopolitical drivers of policy in North Korea, China, and elsewhere.