U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific

Having checked China in Asia, the Biden administration will be a hard act to follow, particularly given regional governments' skepticism of Trump.

China is the biggest factor behind the continued development of the U.S. alliance network – a trend that works independently of, and supersedes, any political dynamics in Washington.

The two sides will find it increasingly difficult to avoid intense security competition over the coming decades, but there are still meaningful choices to make.

Different threat perceptions as well as Japan’s colonization of Korea and atrocities committed during World War II have made even basic trilateral cooperation difficult – until now. 

For Moscow, AUKUS is a threat to the delicate balance in the Asia-Pacific – a region that is crucial to Russia’s economic plans and foreign policy strategy.

Insights from Liselotte Odgaard.

Inter-regional solidarity in the face of aggression is welcome. But there are hard limits to hard commitments outside of a country’s home region.

A mutually assured deterrence could be an alternative diplomatic strategy toward Pyongyang.

The Biden administration took some bold steps to empower its Indo-Pacific allies and partners in 2021. But can it deliver on its promises?

One year into the Biden administration, what should we make of its policy toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific?

The current effort – including AUKUS and the Quad – is missing three critical ingredients compared to early efforts in Cold War Europe.