Since winning the U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump has wasted no time showing Americans he intends to keep his “America First” promises. That includes assembling a tough-on-China “dream team” by picking Representative Mike Waltz and Senator Marco Rubio – two of Congress’s most hawkish members on China – as his national security adviser and secretary of state, respectively.
While Trump appears hell-bent on doubling down on his anti-China crusade, the importance of business conservatives in his clique (like Elon Musk, who has massive investments in China) and his pursuit of a lasting political legacy suggest that his hawkish Cabinet is a long-term strategy, designed to give him leverage for negotiating with Beijing.
Both Waltz and Rubio have a track record of vehement criticism toward China. Waltz, who serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has been a lightning rod for Chinese ire. He not only called for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics due to China’s handling of COVID-19 and mistreatment of Uyghurs, but also asserted that China has “entered into a Cold War” with Washington.
Rubio, known for his longstanding hardline stance on China, has an even higher-profile record in challenging Beijing. He was sanctioned twice by China in 2020 – first in response to U.S. measures against Chinese officials over Uyghur human rights abuses, and second after sanctions on mainland and Hong Kong officials following the 2019 protests in Hong Kong. To this day, Rubio may still be barred from entering China.
Unlike Trump, who tends to view international relations through an economic lens, Waltz and Rubio are more ideologically driven on the China issue. For example, on Taiwan, Trump has voiced concerns that the island has stolen U.S. business in semiconductors and suggested it should pay the U.S. for helping defend it from China. In contrast, Waltz and Rubio have consistently urged Taiwan to increase its defense spending and have advocated shifting U.S. policy focus from the prolonged conflict in Ukraine to Asia, particularly in preparing for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Beyond Waltz and Rubio, Robert Lighthizer – Trump’s former trade chief, who is likely to assume another senior economic role in Trump’s second term – shares a similarly ideological approach. Contrary to economic policymakers who generally favor cooperation over confrontation, Lighthizer has proposed a radical decoupling plan to fully sever China-U.S. economic ties. Although his position in the administration is not yet confirmed, Lighthizer and his allies have already been promoting plans for extensive new tariffs on Chinese imports, likely to surpass anything imposed during Trump’s first term.
With the GOP now controlling the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, Trump has nearly unfettered control over his China policy. For all intents and purposes, Trump’s new hawkish Cabinet is positioned to intensify pressure on China, signaling potential diplomatic confrontations ahead. However, this raises a key question: As Trump fills his Cabinet with staunch China hawks, how will he consider the preferences of business conservatives who support him, who may favor a less confrontational stance?
While many may label Trump as a China hawk due to his own anti-China rhetoric, his lifelong business background reveals an inherently opportunistic nature. Yes, he did initiate a trade war with China, but he did not hesitate to make an about-face and praise Beijing right after securing the Phase One trade agreement with the Asian powerhouse. Unlike Joe Biden, who carefully elevated the China-U.S. competition to a systematic level, Trump’s approach to China is subject to his goals – goals that may include a temporary détente if business interests exert sufficient pressure.
Nonetheless, the cumbersome political machinery in Washington cannot be as flexible as Trump’s own will. Once a certain inertia takes hold, it requires tremendous effort to slow it down, let alone reverse it. While the anti-China legislative agenda may not be as bipartisan as many think, the perception of China as a strategic competitor remains widespread in Washington. For now, Trump must play along with this sentiment, whether or not it reflects his true intentions. Assembling a tough-on-China Cabinet meets the expectations traditional conservatives have of him, even if this Cabinet may be more hawkish than Trump himself prefers.
It is also worth noting that Trump’s key appointees are not only extreme in their views, but also fervent loyalists. This loyalty will give Trump significant flexibility to adjust his China policy as needed, which aligns with his ultimate pursuit of a streamlined government that efficiently serves his agenda. When asking, “What does Trump most want to accomplish in his second term?” the priority that outweighs “making America great again” is the same quest that appeals to every senior politician: securing his own political legacy.
Popular wisdom holds that second-term presidents focus more on their personal legacy – their “place in history” – than on their party’s interests. For Trump, the legacy he is most eager to leave is one he has championed since his first day in politics: shattering the “deep state.” Everything he plans to do in his second term will serve this purpose, and his China policy is no exception.
Cooperation with China, compared to confrontation, would bring more benefit than harm – not only to the United States, but to Trump’s own legacy as president. History tends to favor leaders who deliver positive outcomes over negative ones, and Trump may want to be remembered as the president who steered the United States away from the brink of a cold war with China, much like he has positioned himself as the one who will prevent the U.S. from going to war. By assembling a hawkish yet loyal Cabinet, Trump gains the short-term advantage of employing a “good cop, bad cop” approach to China. This also allows him to advance his long-term foreign policy agenda with minimal interference from bureaucratic wrangling and conflicts of jurisdiction within an increasingly complex foreign affairs system.
Meanwhile, after the failure of his plan to establish a secret line of communication with Russia during his first term, Trump now understands more clearly the importance of having a small and loyal inner circle. If he still intends to end the Russia-Ukraine war as soon as possible, he cannot exclude the option of back-channel diplomacy with China to secure its help in ending the conflict. To that end, he must keep his clique close, even if it means his Cabinet picks initially startle many.
As hawkish as Trump’s team appears, it is, for now, all part of Trump’s tactic to test China, rather than a precise prediction of concrete policy. How truly hawkish Trump’s China policy will be, and how long it will last, largely depends on how much he can consolidate his power in Washington and, equally importantly, how China responds to the signals he sends. Despite all the hawkish rhetoric to be unleashed from his team, one thing is certain: Trump’s business concerns and his pursuit of a lasting political legacy will eventually push him to strike deals with China. Until then, intermittent diplomatic friction between the United States and China is to be expected.