China in the Pacific Islands

With a fundamentally different playing field today, the United States and its Western partners should adapt, if not adopt, the strategies of the Cold War. 

Historically underemphasized, New Delhi-Wellington engagement is now gaining strategic and diplomatic prominence.

The new China-Cook Islands deal has implications for Pacific security, but particularly for New Zealand, the United States, and Australia.

With Honiara as host of this year’s Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting, China could see its influence at the regional body soar.

China has increased aid as part of its bid to become the foreign partner of choice for Pacific Island countries but is playing only a small part in Vanuatu’s earthquake relief.

A treaty, a security agreement, and a new rugby team are significant wins for Australia in its quest to remain the dominant influence in the Pacific region.

Beijing’s politically focused aid gives the United States a unique opportunity, as it maps where Beijing’s interests are deeply sown or where China is trying to expand its influence.

Regional leaders probably criticized China more for its ICBM test than for anything else in recent years. The U.S. should take note.

Although some officials would have seen the test launch as beneficial, either for technical or political reasons, the incident undermines important Chinese foreign policy goals.

The China Coast Guard is expanding its reach in the Pacific, part of a broader campaign to increase Beijing’s security role in the region.

What does it mean for the FSM to tell China it opposes AUKUS and supports the Global Security Initiative?

As China attempts to increase its influence over the PICs, Japan must marshal a strategic response that connects these states to its broader objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2023 Games, hosted by Solomon Islands, underscore China’s growing role in the Pacific Island countries.

Pacific Islands Forum members face challenging conversations about the prickly China-U.S. relationship and its effect on the region.

Rabuka said Fiji was “more comfortable” dealing with nations like Australia, taking a measured tone and notably shifting Fiji further away from entanglement with China.

Examining the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Oceania port visits.

Washington has indeed stepped up engagement, but missteps, half-steps, and mixed messaging are getting in the way.

As Honiara denies its new security pact with China poses a threat to the Pacific, it would behoove the West to consider what it is the Solomons want and need from their partners.

Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare is on his second trip to China – and his first since upending Pacific geopolitics with a China-Solomons security agreement.

Speaking from Japan, Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr. said that three Chinese boats have made “uninvited” entries into his country’s waters since he took office in 2021.

Fiji announced a reconsideration of its 2011 security agreement with China just before signing a new defense agreement with New Zealand. It was subtle but clear signal to Beijing.

The specter of geostrategic competition being mapped onto Fiji’s political fault lines remains a distinct possibility that would be deeply damaging for the nation, and region, as a whole.

Outgoing President David Panuelo released a lengthy letter detailing Beijing’s efforts to bribe and bully Micronesian leaders – and exploring the possibility of recognizing Taiwan instead.

Increased French-U.S. cooperation in the region should be welcome news to Pacific Island states.