China-Myanmar relations

Contrary to some speculation, Beijing is not supporting the ongoing rebel offensive in Shan State.

The capture of the Kyin San Kyawt border gate came as the Chinese military launched live-fire drills along the two countries' border.

An interview with Yun Sun about the progress of the military offensive, and the question of how China’s government is reacting to the conflict on its border.

Growing political turbulence, especially in the northern part of Shan State, has drastically narrowed the chances of progress on a host of large-scale projects.

Wang Xiaohong's talks with senior junta officials took place after a resistance offensive overran junta positions across the northern part of Shan State.

The announcement comes after a rash of deportations of alleged Chinese scammers from rebel-held regions of eastern Myanmar.

Beijing's strategic interests in Myanmar and mainland Southeast Asia ensure that the crackdown on transnational criminality is likely to remain partial and selective.

China's engagement with the hated military administration has pushed its reputation in Myanmar to new lows.

Washington needs to recognize that the situation in both places is part of a single, interconnected struggle to contain Chinese influence.

Qin Gang paid his first visit to Myanmar on May 2, during which he pledged to increase Chinese economic engagement with the military regime.

Myanmar’s deteriorating situation risks destabilizing India’s Northeast, while the junta’s embrace of China poses threats in the Indian Ocean.

For their own interests, if nothing else, India, Thailand, and China need to throw their support behind the country's resistance movement.

After some initial hesitation, China is moving CMEC ahead in tandem with Myanmar’s military rulers – at least where the situation is stable enough to do so.

The growth of human rights atrocities in Myanmar has spilled over to the region – including Chinese nationals forced into labor.

The vague plan would see mainland Southeast Asian countries contribute to the flagship Chinese infrastructure initiative.

Wang Yi's visit to Myanmar for an LMC summit was the first stop on a five-nation tour of Southeast Asia.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has distracted it from a burgeoning partnership – including arms sales – with Myanmar’s junta. Will Beijing fill the gap?

The difference in reporting on the situation in Myanmar between Chinese state media facing international audiences (in English) and Chinese domestic media (in Chinese) reflects the dual political agenda of the Chinese government.

Increasingly, China’s non-action on the Myanmar coup is going against Beijing’s own interests.

The attacks on Myanmar's garment factories have injected an extra complication into an already very complex situation. 

Tin Tin Nyo, Gerard McCarthy, and Yun Sun discuss the coup in Myanmar and where the country is headed.

Beijing has a stated preference for no violence in Myanmar, but the deadly crackdown on February 28 was not enough to provoke China's condemnation.

China will stick to its strict policy of non-intervention, but the military takeover has created a diplomatic headache for Beijing.

A long-running war and COVID-19 muddle development in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar.