The Falklands War of 1982 holds several modern geopolitical and tactical precedents that apply to a potential conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan. In both cases, the contested islands are located near a continental nation-state aimed at reunifying such islands to the mainland, despite long periods passing wherein the island residents either aligned with an over-the-horizon maritime power possessing a representative form of government and/or developed indigenous democratic institutions.
The successful British intervention in the Falklands not only rekindled a sense of national pride but served as a catalyst for elevating the importance of the United Kingdom as a player on the world stage where incipient economic globalization and a protracted Cold War dominated the scene. For the Falkland Islanders, the right to self-determination was secured and later affirmed in a 2013 referendum when alignment with the U.K. was chosen by over 99 percent of the voters.
For the United States, a successful intervention against China (either alone or in coalition with others) in the Taiwan Strait would thwart China’s efforts to usurp the U.S. as the leading world power and allow Taiwanese to define their future as they see fit.
In the Taiwan scenario, the geopolitical stakes are much higher than in the Falklands for two reasons. First, Taiwan possesses a central location within the western Pacific’s First Island Chain. Chinese possession would comprise a distinct break in this U.S. defensive arc extending from Japan through the Philippines. China would gain open access to the Pacific and a large offshore platform from which to base its land-based anti-ship ballistic missile batteries. Indeed, the mountainous terrain of eastern Taiwan allows such missiles to be based in highly defensible silos, forming a sharp contrast to the open coastal plain of China. By contrast, with Taiwan functioning presently as a de facto independent country, China is denied the above scenario.
Second, Taiwan produces over 90 percent of the world’s high-end semiconductors versus the Falklands’ chief export of a relatively common commodity – wool. While Taiwan’s economic factor is subject to some variability, its strategic position, which is inherently geographic, remains permanent.
Despite these differences, one major similarity remains: Barring over-the-horizon intervention, Taiwan as with the Falklands, would capitulate because of the sheer magnitude of the continental entity’s invading force.
Geopolitical Similarities
Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands occurred after the Argentine junta ramped up anti-British sentiment. In doing so, it sought to deflect domestic attention away from the nation’s economic woes and the junta’s horrendous human rights record to a more patriotic line of thinking aimed directly at a foreign power meddling and occupying islands off its mainland.
In today’s China, the regime of Xi Jinping is positioned likewise. It faces economic headwinds due to the lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ramifications of U.S. tariffs and restrictions placed on technology exports from the U.S. to China, which come on top of the Chinese Communist Party’s abysmal human rights record (including mass arrests, extrajudicial internments, and organ harvesting). Indeed, enhanced anti-U.S. rhetoric and claims that China will “unswervingly” seek reunification of Taiwan form a contemporary parallel with the lead-up to the Falklands War.
Argentine control of the Falklands would have secured Argentina’s southern sea frontier and given it geopolitical leverage relative to its claims against Chile regarding the Beagle Channel. Securing Taiwan would likewise amplify China’s leverage against Vietnam and the Philippines relative to its claims in the South China Sea. Compounding these issues is the Chinese regime’s perception of the U.S. as a declining superpower; a perception also held by the Argentine junta relative to the standing of the U.K. in 1982. However, perceptions and reality are often different – something the Argentines found out the hard way.
The recent U.S. reinforcement of its military installations in the Philippines, Palau, and Guam/Northern Mariana Islands serves as counterpoint to China’s declining power narrative, while accentuated internal divisions within the United States serve to reinforce it. President Joe Biden’s statements that the U.S. will defend Taiwan if attacked forms a break from Washington’s past policy of strategic ambiguity. Consequently, the Chinese must address an over-the-horizon hard power intervention.
In addition, the U.S. and its allies would likely impose severe economic sanctions against China and most importantly, could lead a consortium of nations formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent entity should a Chinese invasion occur.
Once engaged, it seems unlikely that a formal declaration of war would occur from either side because such a declaration would be more binding, hinder an exit strategy, and complicate formal relations with other countries. The U.S. would likely receive military assistance from Japan and Australia, yet because Taiwan and the U.S. bases involved are located outside NATO’s jurisdiction, assistance from NATO as a whole may not occur. Instead, any NATO response would likely happen on a bilateral basis. That also occurred in the Falklands War, when the U.S. supplied air-to-air missiles and satellite intelligence to the United Kingdom, while France refused to sell additional Exocet missiles to Argentina.
Tactical Considerations
The Falklands War was fought exclusively by standing forces with each side unable to replace its capital ship and aircraft losses. With that in mind, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) which possesses more ships than the U.S. Navy although less overall tonnage, could theoretically absorb more numerical losses than the U.S. Navy.
Despite this apparent advantage, China lacks naval and combined force of arms experience, whereas the U.S. has exceptionally deep experience in naval warfare and is extremely adept at using its Air Force as a combat force multiplier. Harkening back to the Falklands, Argentina’s inexperience with combined air, naval, and ground operations against a well-versed peer competitor proved to be a major disadvantage, even though the Argentines possessed numerical superiority in ground personnel and combat airplanes.
The United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) disabled the runway at Stanley with its long-range Vulcan bomber, which nullified the ability of the Argentines to move their land-based fighter planes to the Falklands and thereby increase their strike zone relative to the approaching U.K. Naval Task Force. Moreover, subsequent Vulcan raids using Shrike missiles crippled Argentine air defense radars.
For the United States, the ability of heavy long-range bombers (B-52s, B-2s, B-1Bs, and B-21s) operating from bases well beyond China’s strike range to launch long range anti-ship missiles and/or modified air-to-ground missiles from stand-off distances aimed at Chinese ships and coastal infrastructure provides a vastly accentuated parallel. The U.S. bomber fleet is much larger than the three Vulcans used by the RAF in the five Blackbuck air strikes back in 1982. Moreover, the Air Force’s Rapid Dragon program allows for launching palletized long-range cruise missiles from C-130s and C-17s.
Similarly, the ability to launch anti-radiation missiles from stealth planes (B-2s/B21s or F-35s) parallels the precedent set by the British use of Shrike missiles launched from a Vulcan bomber. In a recent series of war games, the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the ability to saturate the Chinese invasion force with incoming ordinance from long-range U.S. Air Force bombers comprised a clear airborne threat.
By contrast, China’s long range bomber force would have a difficult time attacking U.S. homeland targets (even Hawai’i and Alaska) because of the lack of intervening bases. China has no equivalent of the RAF base on Ascension Island because the U.S. and Japan control most of the islands beyond the First Island Chain. Further into the Pacific, a vast void exists between Hawai’i and the U.S. mainland and from Midway Island to Alaska. China’s 2022 security agreement with the Solomon Islands comprises a singular exception, which impacts supply lines from Hawai’i to Australia. China would have to largely rely on long-range missiles, or focus its attack only on U.S. bases and forces in the Western Pacific.
During the Falklands War, the submarine HMS Conqueror homeported the Argentine Navy when it sank the Belgrano (former USS Phoenix). Homeporting the PLAN is not likely even though the extremely lethal U.S. submarine fleet would likely inflict heavy damage on China’s surface vessels and its submarines. Instead, the ability of U.S. aircraft to obliterate Chinese ports could leave large portions of the Chinese fleet stranded at sea, with literally no port in the proverbial storm. This situation forms an applicative reversal of the Falklands scenario, leaving the PLAN fully exposed to the combined offensive power of the U.S. Navy and Air Force, along with that of any other coalition partner(s).
Another tactical precedent from the Falklands War, again with a reversed application in the present day, involved the U.K. unilaterally declaring and successfully enforcing a 200 nautical mile Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falklands. A similar maritime exclusion zone inclusive of airspace around Taiwan declared unilaterally by China should be expected in any conflict. However, the Chinese ability to enforce it would be contested by the U.S. military along with its coalition partner(s), including Taiwan’s navy and air force.
Finally, the Argentines successfully used Exocet missiles to sink British warships, with the U.K. possessing no real countermeasures once launched. Instead, the British had to shoot down the plane (Super Etendard) before it launched an Exocet, something that proved exceedingly difficult. Only the French decision to halt Exocet sales limited Argentina.
Presently, China has emphasized the deployment of land-based anti-ship missiles in its effort to morph its near seas into an extension of the continent, as well as placing similar systems on its planes and ships. Unlike the United Kingdom in 1982, the U.S. defense establishment has been actively pursuing anti-missile defenses, both for its surface ships and bases located in the Western Pacific. The ability to withstand multiple onslaughts of ordinance or effectively pre-empt them (partially at least) by using weapons launched from stealth aircraft to destroy Chinese platforms and/or communication chains remains to be seen.
The French decision to halt Exocet sales to Argentina warrants comment, as the Argentines were unable to re-arm for subsequent operations after expending their limited supply. The United States has experienced 20-plus years of non-stop warfare either directly (Afghanistan and Iraq) or indirectly (the Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Gaza conflicts). To what extent has the United States depleted its stockpiles? How quickly can such stocks be replenished? How quickly can surface ships be re-armed at sea given the over-the-horizon logistics? These considerations will influence the outcome of any hard power showdown involving China.
Conclusions
The precedents associated with the Falklands War in 1982 and their application to a China-U.S. conflict over Taiwan are based on similarities, even though the current situation relative to Taiwan is not identical. Rather than going it alone, the United States would likely have Japan and Australia intervening. Moreover, Taiwan itself would fight with its own military, which is more advanced both qualitatively and quantitatively than what the British possessed in the Falklands. That said, Taiwan’s own military would not last long without over-the-horizon intervention by the United States acting either alone or in coalition with others.
Such a conflict would be fought exclusively with standing forces with near-zero ability to replace capital losses. Consequently, preparation during peacetime is of utmost importance because Taiwan possesses more strategic value than the Falklands, both in terms of geographical position and its production dominance of high-end semiconductors. Indeed, should the U.S. decide not to intervene – or intervene, but be poorly prepared and find itself out-gunned by China – the world will witness a pivot point wherein the dominant power has been usurped by the up-and-coming.
On the other hand, a Chinese failure may result in the termination of Xi’s regime, much as Argentina’s failure in the Falklands ended the junta’s rule.