Quad

The grouping's exact role in the Indo-Pacific is the subject of considerable debate. Here’s what scholars from all four countries could agree on.

With U.S. domestic politics calling President Biden home early, the Quad capitalized on their visits to Hiroshima for the G-7 to meet on May 20.

There is a lot riding on the relationship for both New Delhi and Canberra given that both have a inherent interest in balancing China and ensuring a stable Indo-Pacific strategic order.

New defense and security cooperation efforts are springing up across the Indo-Pacific, between some Quad members and those outside the grouping.

Inconsistencies between what China says and does will likely reduce the willingness of other countries, including India, to take seriously Beijing’s statements about wanting a reset of ties.

Given continuing tensions with China, India will seek to expand its military engagements and security consultations with the Quad.

Lawmakers in Tokyo, Canberra, Washington, and even Seoul should not shy away from pushing New Delhi to uphold its commitment to human rights.

The Thucydides trap cannot be overlooked in considering Japan’s national security strategy in conjunction with the Quad as well as the Japan-U.S. alliance.

India and Australia’s relationship has progressed remarkably, underscoring shared concerns in the Indo-Pacific.

For all the talk of Taiwan contingency, Ladakh is the most likely spot for a war between China and a Quad member.

Writing new rules of the road for critical and emerging technologies is a key imperative for the Quad.

The Australia-Japan-U.S. trilateral is older and more formalized than the Quad – and unlike the latter, it explicitly embraces a defense mandate.